Original article. Political science
UDC 327(5)
DOI: 10.31696/2072-8271-2025-3-3-68-096-110

OPERATIONALIZING RUSSIA-INDONESIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A CONTRIBUTION FROM THE DIGITAL FIELD

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Abstract: The article attempts to outline promising areas of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia in the digital field, as the latter is an important component of the strategic partnership established by the two countries in June 2025. On assessing the state of Russia-Indonesia relations and their vulnerabilities, the author turns to considering the present stage of the digital transformation in the Republic of Indonesia, its main priorities, directions and tools, as well as key challenges the country is encountering in this field. Then, promising areas of Russia-Indonesia cooperation in the digital field, as an attempt of both countries to respond to those challenges, are considered. In the author's view, mostly niche cooperation in practically oriented areas, including the digital transformation, can be the foundation upon which Russia-Indonesia strategic partnership may be premised. Notably, however, the parties will have to do much extra work, including in non-digital areas, in order to translate their plans into reality. Although Russia-Indonesia relations have traditionally been in the focus of Russian and selected foreign specialists, so far there is dearth of research on the digital aspects of the dialogue between the two countries. To fill this research gap is especially timely taking into account the on-going global digital transformation, as well as Russia's and Indonesia's intention to provide their cooperation with an extra impetus after the establishment of the strategic partnership. The synergy of these factors accounts for the relevance of the article, as well as its academic and practical significance.

Keywords: *Russia, Indonesia, strategic partnership, niche cooperation, innovations, digital tools, prospects*

For citation: Kanaev E.A. Operationalizing Russia-Indonesia Strategic Partnership: A Contribution from the Digital Field. *Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya: aktual'nyye problemy razvitiya*, 2025, T. 3, № 3 (68). Pp. 96–110. DOI: 10.31696/2072-8271-2025-3-3-68-096-110

Научная статья. Политические науки

РЕАЛИЗАЦИЯ РОССИЙСКО-ИНДОНЕЗИЙСКОГО СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОГО ПАРТНЕРСТВА: ВКЛАД ЦИФРОВОЙ СОСТАВЛЯЮЩЕЙ

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Аннотация: В статье проведена попытка определить перспективные направления сотрудничества между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Индонезия в цифровой сфере, поскольку последняя является важной составляющей стратегического партнерства, заключенного двумя странами в июне 2025 года. Дав оценку состоянию российско-индонезийских отношений и присущих им «узких мест», автор переходит к рассмотрению современного этапа цифровой трансформации Республики Индонезия, основных приоритетов, направлений и инструментов их реализации, а также ключевых вызовов, стоящих перед страной в этой сфере. После этого проанализированы перспективные направления российско-индонезийского сотрудничества в цифровой сфере как попытка двух стран дать ответ на эти вызовы. Согласно точке зрения автора, именно нишевое сотрудничество, выстраиваемое в практикоориентированных сферах, к числу которых относится цифровая трансформация, может оказаться основой, на которой будет формироваться российско-индонезийское стратегическое партнерство. Однако необходимо учитывать, что для перевода своих планов, относящихся к цифровой сфере, в практическое русло сторонам предстоит приложить немало дополнительных усилий, в том числе развивая диалог по нецифровым направлениям. Хотя российско-индонезийские отношения традиционно являются предметом исследования отечественных и некоторых зарубежных специалистов, до сих пор не появилось работ, где рассматривались бы именно цифровые аспекты диалога между двумя странами. Закрыть эту исследовательскую лакуну особенно своевременно в условиях продолжающейся глобальной цифровой трансформации, а также с учетом намерения России и Индонезии придать дополнительный импульс сотрудничеству после установления отношений стратегического партнерства. Совокупность этих обстоятельств обуславливает актуальность статьи, а также ее научную и практическую значимость.

Ключевые слова: *Россия, Индонезия, стратегическое партнерство, нишевое сотрудничество, инновации, цифровые инструменты, перспективы*

Для цитирования: *Канаев Е.А* Реализация российско-индонезийского стратегического партнерства: вклад цифровой составляющей // Юго-Восточная Азия: актуальные проблемы развития, 2025, Том 3, № 3 (68). С. 96–110. DOI: 10.31696/2072-8271-2025-3-3-68-096-110

In June 2025, Russia and Indonesia elevated their relations to the level of Strategic Partnership. This fact not only reflects the readiness of Moscow and Jakarta to intensify cooperation, but also demonstrates that their relations should gain new substance, as compared to the period before the strategic partnership was established.

As evidenced by the Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia, the technological part of cooperation, including that in the industry 4.0 field, looms large in the prospective plans of both countries[1]. Other documents signed simultaneously with the Declaration, including a memorandum of understanding in the ICT and the media, further demonstrate the importance of the digital component in the Russia-Indonesia strategic partnership. Although the room for cooperation may not be as broad as the parties might expect, as digital cooperation is premised on non-digital assets that are not as developed as those of other Indonesia's partners, nevertheless, promising directions are in place. In light of this, a broad and detailed assessment of cooperation between Russia and Indonesia in the digital field is a timely and relevant exercise.

The Road to the Strategic Partnership: the Background and Context of Russia-Indonesia Relations

Although there is no dearth of research focusing on relations between the USSR/Russia and Indonesia, nevertheless, their brief outline is relevant. The parties established diplomatic relations in February 1950. Despite the Soviet support for a newly independent country, the Indonesian elite did not accept the Soviet ideology positively. Notwithstanding this, Indonesia's neutral policy resonated well with the Soviet vision for future international affairs, as it could weaken the US' positions in Southeast Asia. Later on, due to the anti-communist stance of the Indonesian leadership in 1966-1988, Soviet-Indonesia relations were relegated to a "minimum sufficiency" level. Since the 1990s, the de-politicization of relations has become a conspicuous development, because of which the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia premise their relations on a neutral and mutually beneficial foundation[2].

The decision to establish a strategic partnership was an outcome of several factors. Russia and Indonesia share a common vision for key global and regional developments. Both parties aim to diversify their foreign policy tools, which makes them explore new partnerships and niches of cooperation. Both countries are multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, because of

which exchanging experience of how to build a harmonious society is their shared priority. Amidst deepening global entropy, both Russia and Indonesia explore possibilities to enhance their resilience by upgrading tools of competitiveness at their disposal. Among other policy steps, it means strengthening economic, political and security ties.

These shared perceptions are in synergy with the provisions of Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Indonesia. The document is comprehensive, as its directions include bilateral, regional and global tracks. Russia-Indonesia cooperation is integrated in the regional and global multilateral dialogue mechanisms, and its niche tracks like education, the socio-cultural field, energy etc. matter strongly[3]. The documents that were adopted simultaneously with the Declaration extend on and specify its provisions in practically-oriented fields.

No doubt, the establishment of the strategic partnership is an event of profound significance. Notwithstanding this, it has to be adopted to the present state of relations between Russia and Indonesia that is characterized by three main imbalances.

The first imbalance is a gap between developed channels of communication and insufficient economic and commercial outcomes. On the one hand, Russia and Indonesia hold a close dialogue at all levels. Apart from the bilateral track, Russia and Indonesia coordinate their positions within the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus and the East Asia Summit. At the global level, the G20 and the United Nations are potential venues of Russia-Indonesia dialogue. Since recently, an expanded BRICS format has been another global track along which Russia and Indonesia may cooperate.

Additionally, the ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership and the ASEAN Russia Digital Partnership have special significance. In the former case, the milieu around Russia-Indonesia dialogue is conducive to fostering cooperation, with a positive cumulative effect on its niche areas. This factor should be seen in the context of ASEAN's intention to increase cooperation with its external partners[4]. Logically, new possibilities for cooperation between Indonesia and Russia are likely to appear and gain traction.

Notwithstanding the solid and diversified political side of Russia-Indonesia cooperation, the parties conspicuously underperform along the economic track. Between 2012 and 2024, trade in goods between Indonesia and Russia rose from 3,4 billion dollars to 4.0 billion dollars, while corresponding trade figures between Indonesia and China, the US and India accounted for 51,0 billion dollars, 26,5 billion dollars and 16,8 billion dollars

(in 2012) and 136,6 billion dollars, 38,6 billion dollars and 26,0 billion dollars (in 2024) respectively[5]. As of 2024, the first four positions – namely, HS 2-Digit codes 27 (mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral waxes), 31 (fertilizers), 10 (cereals) and 25 (salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement) accounted for 95,8% of Russia's export[6]. There are relatively few Russian investment projects in Indonesia[7]. Although the situation will change after the parties established a Joint Russian-Indonesia Investment Platform (RIDNIP) in June 2025[8], the scale and tempo of progress remains to be seen.

A second imbalance relates to a gap between the congruence in Russia's and Indonesia's priorities regarding Asia-Pacific multilateral cooperation and their limited ability to coordinate prospective plans. At this point, the sequence of Russian and Indonesian APEC chairmanships in 2012 and 2013 matters[9]. While an emphasis on connectivity was conspicuous in both agendas, impressive progress in cooperation did not take place. From an economic perspective, Russia's lack of participation in Asia-Pacific global value chains matters the strongest, as the latter are the foundation of any trans-boundary economic and commercial activity across the region.

In the years to come, major priorities of Russia and Indonesia concerning Asia-Pacific multilateral cooperation may further diverge. The reasons stem from Russia's absence in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP has a global potential since, as an ISEAS expert pointed out, it "covers 30 per cent of global GDP, half of the world's population, and a quarter of world exports"[10]. More importantly, it is the key initiative of economic regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region driven by the association. As Russia does not participate in the RCEP, it does not contribute to setting the parameters of trade and investment cooperation across the region. Arguably, as the influence of the RCEP as a role player in the regional economic development steadily rises, Russia's absence there will be increasingly taken into account by the Indonesian leadership.

Discouragingly, this factor will be detrimental not only to the regional, but to the global dimension of relations between Russia and Indonesia. The concept of open regionalism, which is the cornerstone of Asia-Pacific multilateral economic cooperation, considers regional integration as part of economic processes beyond the region. Arguably, it may negatively influence upon establishing and maintaining economic ties within the BRICS Plus format.

A third imbalance stands for the present low tempo of resolving those problems and increasing urgency for enhancing cooperation. In light

of this, the growth of anti-Russian sanctions deserves considering. Since the Special Military Operation started, anti-Russian sanctions have surged. As of August 2025, they totaled to 25,691 restrictive measures[11]. As Indonesia aims to increase its global influence, while cooperation the BRICS Plus members is at an incipient stage, the country expands cooperation with its traditional partners, including the US and the EU. Revealingly, Indonesia's trade with the US increased from 26,5 billion dollars to 38,5 billion dollars between in 2012 and 2024 respectively[12]. Although Indonesia-EU trade turnover stagnates, these figures are big enough to regard the EU a promising economic partner. Logically, this factor is taken into consideration by the Indonesian leadership, with corresponding influence on Russia-Indonesia cooperation.

From a theoretical perspective, Russia and Indonesia have to clarify what strategic partnership is and what value added it brings to the present state of their cooperation. In this regard, ASEAN-Russia strategic partnership gives food for thought. In its present form, it provides little clarity on what factors incentivized ASEAN and Russia to establish a strategic partnership, and what issues strategic for their development ASEAN and Russia address and resolve together. In order to avoid similar misunderstanding, Russia and Indonesia must specify the parameters of their strategic partnership.

In the current circumstances, cooperation between Russia and Indonesia will inevitably be based on Russia's readiness to take into account Indonesia's developmental priorities and prospective plans. In this regard, the close attention that the Indonesian leadership pays to the digital transformation of the country is of immense significance.

Indonesia's Policy on the Digital Transformation: a View from Russia

The Republic of Indonesia attaches much importance to raising its digital competitiveness, including that in the digital field. Practically, Indonesia premises its digital policy on Making Indonesia 4.0 initiative. Mostly, it aims to transform the development from resource-based to innovation-based paradigm by reducing the country's dependence on extractive industries and increasing the share of its innovative production in general and innovative export in particular. Collectively, the implementation of these tasks is expected to increase the country's labor productivity and global competitiveness. From a practical perspective, food and beverages, automotive, chemical, textile and textile products, electronics, and medical devices were outlined as key priority sectors[13].

While implementing Making Indonesia 4.0, the country encounters several challenges. Specifically, Indonesia has limited R&D capacity. According to the most recent figures presented by the World Bank, the research and development expenditure in Indonesia (% of GDP) stood at 0,28% (2020), as compared with 3,41% in Japan (2022) and 5,21% in the Republic of Korea (2022)[14]. Because of that, the national hardware is underdeveloped, and reliance upon imported components, for instance, semiconductor devices, is high. No less importantly, Indonesia does not possess a sufficient pool of human resources, while, according to its top officials, the country will need nine million specialists in the digital field, mostly in programming, software engineering, software development, cloud computing and AI, by 2030[15]. For Indonesian universities, this task is difficult to resolve, as their curriculum is updated every four years, which is not sufficient to catch up with technological innovations.

Indonesia's conservative approach to data localization is of special note. As compared to other ASEAN countries, with the exception of Vietnam, the country imposes tough restrictions on data transfers, which is premised on national security considerations[16]. From a commercial perspective, however, it hampers the implementation of trans-boundary digital projects, as permanent data transfers are among their indispensable components.

Another point to discuss has to do with cybersecurity. As the digitalization-related boom continues, the country encounters cybercrimes of all sorts. Unsurprisingly, as the results of the 2024 AIBP Cybersecurity in ASEAN Survey demonstrate, 43,7% of respondents in Indonesia regarded cyber security and privacy concerns as the key challenges to the digital transformation[17]. The sectors that suffered from cyber-attacks included, but were not limited to, healthcare, education and government services. In response, the country launched several initiatives, among which Cyber Security and Resilience Bill with an objective to bring the legislation to a common denominator is of special note. Apart from it, the Personal Data Protection Law (modelled after the EU's General Data Protection Regulation with severe punishment for unauthorized data collection or other violations of law) must be mentioned individually. Presidential Decree № 47/2023 with digital economy protection, cyber resilience building and global cyber governance as priorities deserve attention. Furthermore, Presidential Regulation № 82 with a focus on the protection of the country's information infrastructure is another case in point. The Cybersecurity and Resilience Bill looms large in the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2025-2029. Lastly, the Indonesian leadership aims to respond to AI-related develop-

ments, as the AI becomes both a tool to counter digital threats and a source of concern. This resulted in the development of the National Strategy for AI (2020-2045) with healthcare, government services, education and research, food security, and smart cities and mobility as top priorities[18]. Collectively, these efforts are likely to qualitatively increase the level of AI implementation across the country.

Although these attempts are laudable, there remain many issues to address. Specifically, there are no detailed guidelines about how to deal with data breaches. More specifically, it is unclear how the public must be informed on such events, as well as what government agencies, the corporate sector and consumers must do in order to mitigate the negative consequences of data breaches. This is all the more important since the majority of cyber-attacks in Indonesia goes to organizations (62%) and the corporate sector (23%)[19]. If so, Indonesian legislators will have to specify many issues, performing this task in a forward-looking, anticipatory regime.

Tellingly, Indonesia under-invests in cyber security. According to the global management consulting firm Kearney, Indonesia spends only 0,02% of its GDP on cyber security, which is the lowest indicator in Southeast Asia[20]. This should be seen in synergy with the country's other vulnerabilities like, for instance, lack of skilled person-power in the cyber security field.

In a longer-term perspective, Indonesia is likely to encounter a serious problem. Due to its potential in scaling up economic and commercial opportunities, Indonesia aims to become a digital hub in Southeast Asia. Undoubtedly, the country possesses necessary assets to fulfill this role, from large population (as its consumer base and the number of internet users are increasing) to government-led programs aimed at enhancing the country's competitiveness. Indonesia will remain an attractive investment destination, as its ICT market size is expected to reach 72,53 billion dollars in 2030. Although many problems are in place (for instance, the fixed internet connection is a challenging task for a country with 17,500 islands, with seamless 5G internet infrastructure as a special problem), coupled with a strict approach to data localization, nevertheless, the country has a sufficient potential to become a digital hub with broadening economic possibilities and increasing commercial attractiveness. The more so since the Indonesian corporate sector is actively developing numerous commercial practices like, for instance, fintech, healthtech, edtech, wealthtech, martech

etc. Tellingly, 20% of all fintech companies across Southeast Asia is located in Indonesia, while the country's e-commerce market size is expected to increase from 52,93 billion dollars to 86,81 billion dollars between 2023 and 2028 respectively[21].

The problem, however, lies in a different realm. As the US-China geopolitical rivalry embraces the digital field, Indonesia becomes a focus of their contradictions that stem from the construction of digital infrastructure. Specifically, the SeaMeWe-6 system, initially supported by China, was transferred to the US-based company SubCom because of political lobbying[22]. As more than 50 cable systems run through Indonesia, the country finds itself in the position of a swing state that must respond to the interests of many stakeholders, including those with diverging priorities. To reap the benefits of a swing state, or to convert its potential into real power with bright prospects, the country has to increase its digital competitiveness at an exponential rate. Otherwise, Indonesia will remain just a transit area for data traffic and with no real influence upon substantial cooperation in the digital field.

Indonesia's moderate success in developing its national digital ecosystem is reflected in international rankings. Although there are many reference materials, the World Digital Competitiveness Ranking, published by the World Competitiveness Center of the International Institute for Management Development (IMD), is the most representative, as it allows assessing the overall digital competitiveness of various countries across multiple criteria. As of 2025, Indonesia's overall rank is 51 (of 69 economies), while its positions accounting for knowledge, technology and future readiness as key enables of digital competitiveness stand at positions 62, 48 and 43 respectively. The five-year dynamics is uneven: although a significant increase in the overall performance took place in 2023 (position 45) and 2024 (position 43), between 2021 and 2025, the country progressed from position 53 to position 51 respectively[23].

In sum, Indonesia encounters both opportunities and challenges from a digital transformation perspective. To its credit, the country takes active steps aimed at increasing its potential and, by extension, influence on regional and global digital processes. At the same time, Indonesia finds this task increasingly difficult due to its rising complexity. More competitive international digital milieu around Indonesia is another point of concern. Logically, the country finds it necessary to expand its room of maneuver, including by means of cooperation with external partners. Among the latter, the Russian Federation looms all the larger.

Russia-Indonesia Cooperation in the Digital Field: an Assessment of Promising Directions

Taking into consideration the factors discussed above, cooperation between Russia and Indonesia in the digital field will inevitably be based on the coordination of prospective plans. In practice, it will mean Russia's readiness to take into account Indonesia's digital priorities and sensitivities. Arguably, there are three major directions.

The first one relates to cybersecurity. It includes, but is not limited to, Russia's deliveries of ready solutions and the organization of joint educational programs and events by Russian companies and universities. At this point, the example of Kaspersky Lab is noteworthy. The company operates in many ASEAN countries including Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Its services include not only anti-virus programs, but also complex solutions for business[24]. With relevance to Indonesia, Kaspersky Lab's decision to establish a distribution network in Indonesia and Malaysia to promote the Kaspersky OS operating system is of special note, as it allows scaling up the company's technological and commercial possibilities[25].

Apart from the example of Kaspersky Lab, other Russian ICT companies operate in Southeast Asian markets. Most noticeable examples include, among others, Group-IB, Positive Technologies and Softline. As Indonesia aims to diversify its partners in the digital field, including cybersecurity, more Russian companies are likely to enter the Indonesian market.

This scenario seems even more realistic due to the changing nature of cybersecurity. Its effective maintenance includes not only anti-virus programs, but also "security projecting", exemplified by Security Behavior and Culture Programs, with the human factor as a key focus. Another aspect of the task relates to managing not only intra-company, but also external cyber risks. Lastly, CTEM (Continuous Threat Exposure Management) programs with an all-embracing approach to cyber risks is another marker of the current ecosystem approach to cybersecurity. Apart from the aforementioned factors, the mutual influence of cybersecurity concerns and AI tools is a matter of crucial importance. As discussed above, Indonesia lacks sufficient competences to develop a competitive AI ecosystem, which incentivizes it to expand cooperation with foreign partners, among which Russia matters all the stronger.

The second direction accounts for sectoral cooperation. At this point, healthtech might be a relevant example. Russia develops many systems and solutions like, for instance, Celsus (detection of pathological foci in radiog-

raphy and computed tomography), Care Mentor AI (an AI system for interpreting the results of X-ray, CT, MRI and mammography checkups to better detect pathologies at early stages), CVL CVisionRad (cloud service for analyzing the results of radiological examinations) and others[26]. Undoubtedly, they will be of interest to medical organizations in Indonesia. This is all the more important since in Russia the AI-based healthcare market is growing steadily. To exemplify, it is expected to surge from 12 billion rubles in 2024 to 78 billion rubles in 2030[27]. If so, new Russian digital products and solutions in the healthtech sector will appear, which will be welcomed by Russia's partners, including Indonesia.

No less importantly, Russian smart city-related solutions might be appealing to Indonesia. The experience of Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Ufa, Kazan and other Russian cities, ranging from smart housing utilities to public security by means of digital tools will respond to the priorities of ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, since they implement the initiative ASEAN Smart Cities Network. Additionally, the Digital Twin of Moscow, a 3D model of the city and an efficient tool of urban planning and management[28], may be of special significance. At the same time, however, lack of Russian participation in the construction of non-digital infrastructure objects in cities of ASEAN countries is a serious obstacle to these plans.

The third area worth exploring relates to equipping Indonesia's policy relevant to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations with Russian digital tools. The Russian product "The Unified United State Emergency Prevention and Response System" integrates large amounts of data, which contributes to making a complex picture of on-going events and better coordination of efforts between various participants of search and rescue operations. More than that, the system facilitates monitoring threats in an anticipatory format and grants an access to skill training programs[29]. As Indonesia encounters natural disasters of different sorts regularly, cooperation in this field can be promising.

Among other directions that deserve exploring, GovTech tools may be highly promising. The more so since the Indonesian leadership develops ambitious plans concerning e-government services[30]. Russia's experience in developing effective digital tools of government services like, for instance the Unified Digital Platform of the Russian Federation GovTech with a wide range of tasks[31] will be of interest to Indonesia. As the RI attaches immense importance to the digital support of its agriculture, which is exemplified by the e-Agriculture National Strategy implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture in cooperation with FAO[32], Russia's digital products may be useful. To substantiate, Russia develops its own programs and

initiatives of equipping agriculture with digital tools, as exemplified by smart farming, automated systems of agricultural enterprises, robotic agricultural machinery, predictive analytics based on big data, IoT in the agricultural sector, genomics, trading platforms and blockchain[33].

As evidenced by the MoU signed in July 2025, Russia's digital tools in the transport sector may be a focus of Indonesia's interest. The more so since the Indonesian leadership regards the digital transformation of the national transport system as an urgent priority[34]. Since the ICT and the mass media are special areas of cooperation between Russia and Indonesia, as demonstrated by the MoU signed in June 2025, new projects and initiatives will be launched with positive implications for Russia-Indonesia cooperation in the digital field.

A timely step is to expand training Indonesian students at Russian Universities. This is all the more important since the parties concluded a relevant agreement that is a more obliging form of cooperation than MoUs. Since training programs embrace both digital and non-digital fields, a cumulative effect on equipping non-digital areas of Russia-Indonesia cooperation with digital tools will be conspicuous.

At the same time, however, digital cooperation is to a considerable extent a function of non-digital ties premised upon a strong and diversified foundation established before the current digital transformation. Parallel efforts must focus on increasing the overall scale and tempo of cooperation between Russia and Indonesia. For instance, Russian healthtech technologies and equipment will be in growing demand in case more Indonesian students are trained at Russian medical institutes. Even if outcomes are not impressive and do not appear overnight, these efforts will be fruitful in a mid-term and especially in a long-term perspective.

In sum, ample evidence demonstrates that Indonesia focuses upon sectoral de-risking as a central component of its overall national resilience. Since in the current circumstances resilience comes to growing prominence and increasingly embraces the digital field, powerful digital tools will loom all the larger in the priorities of the Indonesian government and the corporate sector. If so, prospects for cooperation between Indonesia and Russia in the digital field appear to be good.

Conclusions

The analysis of the digital aspects of the strategic partnership established by Russia and Indonesia seen through the prism of the dynamics of relations between the two countries and Indonesia's digital priorities leads to several broad assessments.

The prevailing trends in Russia-Indonesia relations are a function of interplay of global, regional and bilateral developments. At the global level, the key driver is the rise of the collective non-West as an alternative to the current model of globalization, in which Russia and Indonesia play an important role. The regional and the bilateral tracks also contribute to strengthening shared interest of the Russian and the Indonesian leadership in intensifying cooperation. At the same time, however, fundamental shortcomings as an outcome of long-term policy deficiencies incentivize both countries to start from a policy of small steps.

The strategic partnership concluded by Russia and Indonesia in June 2025 marks a new status of their relations. Surely, it must be provided with real substance across practically-oriented tracks. The digital field is a promising niche, as it allows both countries to coordinate their prospective plans and development priorities. The parties may start from equipping Indonesia's economy with Russian digital tools with prospects for expanding cooperation across other tracks. As Indonesia aims to in[35]crease its overall digital resilience, Russia has much to offer.

ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ОБ АВТОРЕ

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Статья поступила в редакцию 03.11.2025;
одобрена после рецензирования 15.11.2025;
принята к публикации 30.11.2025.

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The article was submitted 03.11.2025;
approved 15.11.2025;
accepted to publication 30.11.2025.

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