



THE THIRD MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL RUSSIA-KOREA CONFERENCE

Current Trends in Russian Studies in Korea and Korean Studies in Russia

Date 2026. 2. 5. (Thursday)

Venue Institute of Oriental Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences), Moscow

Hosted by

Institute of Oriental Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences)
Center for Northeast Asian Studies (Chosun University)
Center for Interdisciplinary Education and Research (Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology)

Sponsored by

Chosun University, GIST, National Research Foundation of Korea

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Program

- Each presentation is expected to last 20 minutes with an additional 10 minutes for discussion and 10 minutes for questions.

Time	Topic	Presenter	Discussant
13:00 ~ 13:15	Participant Registration		
13:15 ~ 13:30	Opening of the Conference		
Session 1. Current Trends in Korean Studies in Russia			
Moderator : Vorontsov Alexander Valentinovich (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)			
13:30 ~ 14:10	From the History of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the Study of Korea in the 19th–Early 21st Centuries	Alina Sharafetdinova (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)	Kang Kyung Min (Moscow City Pedagogical University)
14:10 ~ 14:50	The Authoritarian Period in the History of the Republic of Korea (1948–1987) in Soviet and Russian Historiography	Alexander Kurmyzov (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)	Jang Jin Ho (GIST)
14:50 ~ 15:30	The development of Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula Based on Archival Materials	Georgy Pogosyan (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)	Kim Mu Gyeom (Moscow State University)
15:30 ~ 16:00	Coffee Break		
Session 2. Current Trends in Russian Studies in Korea			
Moderator : Kim Natalia (Moscow State University)			
16:00 ~ 16:40	Research Trends on the History of Russian Economic Thought in Korean Academia and the Implications of New Methodological Approaches	Kim Dong Hyuk (GIST)	Natalia Matveeva (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)
16:40 ~ 17:20	Promotional Corps for Peaceful Coexistence: Soviet Buddhist Delegation Visits to Asian Countries in the Khrushchev’s Era	Kwon Kyung Taek (Pusan National University)	Alexander Vorontsov (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)
17:20 ~ 18:00	Results and Prospects of the Studies on the Soviet Economy and Its Management System in South Korea	Ko Kwang Yeol (Yonsei University)	Ruben Kazarian (Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)
18:00	Closing of the Conference		

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THE THIRD MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL
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Session 1

Current Trends in Korean Studies in Russia

Moderator : Alexander V. Vorontsov
(Institute of Oriental Studies RAS)

From the History of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the Study of Korea in the 19th–Early 21st Centuries

Alina Sharafetdinova (Institute of Oriental Studies)

Summary

This report briefly examines the history of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the study of Korea in the 19th – early 21st centuries. After the liberation of Korea in 1945 until the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Republic of Korea in 1990, the attention of Soviet researchers was mainly focused on North Korea, but after 1990 the situation changed and aspects of the economic and political development of the Republic of Korea also began to be studied properly. Against the backdrop of dramatic changes in relations between the two countries since the Soviet period, there has been a significant increase in research interest in the Korean Peninsula. This article examines the main challenges faced by scholars in the study of Korean peninsula and also presents a number of key works devoted to specific aspects of this area of research.

Keywords: Historiography, Korea, Republic of Korea, DPRK, Russia, Institute of Oriental Studies, Orientalists

The development of scholarly Korean studies in Russia dates back to 1900–1917. In 1900, the Russian Ministry of Finance published the three-volume "Description of Korea,"¹ which summarized numerous works by Russian and European authors on the history, politics, economics, culture, and geography of Korea that had been published by that time, including diaries, notes, and travel memoirs. Leading orientalist and specialists in the Far East, including D.M. Pozdnev, E.G. Spalvin, and N.V. Kyuner, contributed to the encyclopedia's preparation.

¹ Описание Кореи, СПб, 1900 год

In 1960, scholars G.F. Kim and I.S. Kazakevich of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences published an abridged edition of the three-volume "Description of Korea" in a single volume, incorporating the most important parts of the original. The central part of the new edition was N.V. Kyuner's "Brief Review of the History of Korea." The chapter is valuable because it is based on primary sources (major works, diaries, and contemporary memoirs about Korea). Notably, "A Brief History of Korea" covers the country's history from ancient times. It cites various legends about the origins of the ancient Korean state of Joseon, along with information on its size and borders, drawn from Chinese sources. The essay also includes data on the creation of the states of Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla². The key points and conclusions of "A Description of Korea" remain relevant today. According to B.D. Tyagay, this three-volume publication "sufficiently and comprehensively revealed a picture of the state of Korean society from ancient times to the end of the 19th century."³

After 1945, scholarly interest in the liberated neighboring country of Korea grew. The first to address Korean topics was the Pacific Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which had been operating in Moscow since 1934. Eminent scholars—specialists in Japan and international relations, such as E.M. Zhukov, A.L. Galperin, A.A. Guber, and others—published their first articles on Korea in the "Scientific Notes" published by the institute. Our scholars F.I. Shabshina, G.D. Tyagay, and G.F. Kim began their research work in Korean studies at the Institute.

Founded in 1930 in Leningrad, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences (IOS RAS) was transferred to Moscow in 1950. At that time, it was merged with the Pacific Institute, making it the main research center for the study of the history, culture, and contemporary issues of the countries of the East. Korea has consistently occupied a prominent place among the Institute's research areas. The ranks of the aforementioned Korean scholars were swelled by graduates of Korean

² Korean Studies in Russia: History and Modernity. Vol. 2. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004. P. 64.

³ Ibid. P. 64.

departments established at Soviet universities: V.I. Ivanova, V.I. Shipaev, I.S. Kazakevich, G.V. Gryaznov, V.M. Mazurov, B.V. Sinitsyn, Yu.V. Vanin, and others. In 1956, a Korean sector was established at the Institute of Oriental Studies, which became a leader in Soviet and Russian Oriental studies. Currently, research in Korean studies is concentrated in the Department of Korea and Mongolia (Head: A.V. Vorontsov) and the Department of Korean History and Culture (Head: B.B. Pak). The Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences is the oldest center of modern Russian Korean studies. It has produced the largest number of works on Korea published in the USSR and Russia over the past half-century. Currently, he continues to exert a significant influence on the development of Korean studies in Russia and enjoys authority in world science.

In assessing the changes in relations in the post-Soviet period, it is impossible not to touch upon a number of issues relating to the relationship between the USSR and the DPRK, both during the favorable times when the Soviet Union provided assistance to the North Korean people in their post-war reconstruction, and after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea on September 30, 1990, which at the time provoked discontent among North Korean authorities and led to a cooling in relations. Among the works that form the basis for the modern study of Russian-North Korean relations, it is necessary to note the works of eminent scholars of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences: G. V. Gryaznov, L. A. Usova, V. D. Tikhomirov, Yu. V. Vanin, F. I. Shabshina, and G. F. Kim⁴. Prominent Korean scholars V.D. Tikhomirov⁵ and Yu.V.

⁴ Usova L. A. Fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union in the formation and development of the DPRK (1945-1961) – the Far East and Southeast Asia. History, economy and culture. Moscow, 1984. Gryaznov G. V. Restoration and development of industry of the DPRK in the post-war period (1953-1956). Korea. History and economy. Moscow, 1958; Economy of the DPRK. – Modern Korea. Reference publication. Moscow, 1971; Actual problems of economic development of the DPRK (1980-1990). Korea at the turn of the century. Moscow, 2002; Study of the economy of North Korea. – Study of Korea in Russia: history and modernity. Seoul, Korea, 1999 (Korean); Shabshina F. I. History of international relations in the Far East. 1945-1977. Khabarovsk, 1978. (Co-authored with V.K. Pak and V.D. Tikhomirov). Korean-Chinese Relations from Ancient Times to the Present Day. Modern Times. – Special Bulletin of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 1965, No. 58. (Co-authored with V.K. Pak and M.N. Khan). Kim G.F. Some Current Problems of Modern Development of the Liberated Countries of the East. – World History and the East. Moscow, 1989.

⁵ Tikhomirov V.D. History of Korea (from ancient times to the present day). Vol. 2. Moscow, 1974 (author of sections); 30 years of People's Korea. – International Life. 1975, No. 8; International relations in the Asian-

Vanin⁶ devoted considerable attention to domestic political processes in the DPRK, the development of relations between our countries, and the problem of resolving the conflict on the Korean Peninsula.



Fig. 1. Fanya Isaakovna Shabshina (1906-1998) - Doctor of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. From 1940 to 1946, she was in Korea, where her husband, Anatoly Ivanovich Shabshin (Kulikov), worked as vice-consul at the USSR Consulate General. Fanya Isaakovna set out her valuable observations and impressions of Korea before and after liberation, reflections on the fate of this country, and recollections of many interesting people in the books "South Korea. 1945-1946. Notes of an Eyewitness" (1974) and in "Colonial Korea (1940-1945). Notes and Reflections of an Eyewitness" (1992). Both works have been translated into Korean and published in the Republic of Korea. F.I. Shabshina's more than 100 scientific papers are devoted to the national liberation movement of the Korean people, the development of Korea, primarily North Korea, after 1945, and the identification of general patterns and specific features of modern Korean history. For many years, F.I. Shabshina headed the Department of Korea at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. For her work, F.I. Shabshina was awarded the honorary title of "Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation" and several state awards. (<https://www.livelib.ru/author/1073777-fanya-shabshina>)

Pacific region at the turn of the 1970-1980s. – Problems of peace and security in Asia. Moscow, 1987. (In co-authorship); The Korean Peninsula in the security system in the Far East. – International relations and current problems of ensuring peace and security in the Far East. Part 2. Moscow, 1988; USSR and Korea. Moscow, 1988. (Author of sections); The Korean problem and international factors (1945 – early 80s). Moscow, 1998.

⁶ Ванин Ю.В. Советский Союз и Северная Корея, 1945 – 1948. М.: ИВ РАН, 2016; История Кореи. Избранные статьи. М.: ИВ РАН, 2016; СССР и Корея. М.: ГРВЛ, 1988 (Автор глав); Корея на рубеже веков. М., 2002 (автор глав); Корейский кризис: позиция России. // Правда. 29 октября 2017 г.



The entire academic career of Georgy Fyodorovich Kim (1924-1989) (Fig. 2), Doctor of Historical Sciences and Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences, was associated all his life with the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where he rose from a low-rank employee to First Deputy Director of the Institute, and from 1985 to 1987, he served as Acting Director of the Institute. In 1956, Georgy Fyodorovich headed the Korean Sector at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and later managed larger research divisions, including the Korean division. G.F. Kim's research focused on the history of the emergence and development of the Korean working class, its struggle for national liberation and social rights, and its participation in the socio-political processes that took place in the DPRK after the liberation. Since the 1970s. G.F. Kim studied general theoretical issues of the history and contemporary situation of the East, with Korea continuing to occupy a central place in his research, which comprised over 100 of his scholarly publications. Fulfilling a commission from the Soviet leadership, Georgy Fedorovich visited the Republic of Korea in 1988 and met with then-President Roh Tae-woo. G.F. Kim's achievements were recognized with the USSR State Prize, several Soviet state awards, and a high order of the Republic of Korea (posthumously).



Galina Davydovna Tyagay (1922-2006) (Fig. 3), Doctor of Historical Sciences, researched the socio-political situation in Korea in the second half of the 19th century and the struggle of the people against feudal oppressors and foreign invaders. In the 1970s, she shifted her focus to the history of social thought in Korea, primarily the ideological and political movements of Sirhak, Kaehwa Undong, and Kaemon Undong. Thanks to her work, the views and actions of thinkers and fighters for Korean independence and progress became the property of Soviet and Russian scholarship. She also analyzed some of the concepts of foreign researchers and described the Korean collections of the main Russian archives containing materials on the history of Korea in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In total, G.D. Tyagay published over 80 scholarly works.

As a practitioner of bilateral relations during his leadership in responsible positions in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Dmitrievich Tikhomirov (Fig. 4) participated in the development of many steps by the Soviet leadership in the Korean direction, including the preparation and signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK (July 1961).



Fig. 4. Tikhomirov V.D. (June 7, 1929 – December 16, 1989) was born in Moscow. He graduated from the Moscow Institute of International Relations in 1952, holds a PhD in History (April 2, 1970), Doctor of History (December 28, 1984). Employee of the Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU (1952-1958), the Central Committee of the CPSU (1958-1969). Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1969-1989), Head of the Sector of Regional and International problems. About 50 works have been published. He was awarded orders and medals of the USSR. (<http://www.rauk.ru/ru/reference-biblio/169-reference/reb-bib/ref-t/1564-2014-11-01-08-12-18?ysclid=lnn47gq2z2956567220>)

Yuri Vasilevich Vanin (Fig. 5), in addition to his outstanding scholarly work in the field of Korean studies (he has published over 100 works on the history and contemporary issues of Korea), is widely known in Russia and abroad for his publications in the central press regarding the mistakes made in Korean policy by the Russian leadership since the early 1990s.



Fig. 5. Vanin, Yu.V. (September 4, 1930 - October 21, 2017) born in the village of Piscovo, Lev-Tolstoy District, Ryazan Region. From 1949 to 1954, he studied at the History Department of Moscow State University as part of the first Korean studies group in the university's history, created and headed by M. N. Pak. Cand. of History (February 25, 1963). From November 1960, he was a junior research fellow, and from December 1965, a senior research fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (then the Institute of the Peoples of Asia). From February 1985, he was the Head of the Korea sector of the Department of Socialist Countries of Asia. From 1987 to 2005, he was the Head of this department, which was transformed into the Department of Korea and Mongolia in 1992. Over 100 works on the history and contemporary issues of Korea have been published, some of which have been published in the DPRK and the ROK. He was awarded the Order of Friendship of the DPRK, several medals, the Silver Medal of the USSR Exhibition of Economic Achievements (as a member of the "History of Korea" authors' collective), and the Honorary Badge of the Korean Friendship Society. On December 2, 2015, he was awarded the I.Yu. Krachkovsky Medal. (<http://www.rauk.ru/ru/reference-biblio/153-reference/reb-bib/ref-v/1099-2011-04-02-193316-sp-756224439>) (Accessed: 12 October 2023).

For obvious reasons, the DPRK dominated the socio-political and scholarly work of Korean studies scholars, but the South Korean focus gradually gained momentum. Beginning in the late 1950s, books and articles about the Republic of

Korea were published, and Soviet public interest in the country grew. Scholars at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences voluntarily submitted proposals to the highest party and government bodies, calling for a more flexible and principled policy and for finding ways to normalize relations with the Republic of Korea, which, in their view, would serve the national interests of the USSR and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Particularly active in this work were G.F. Kim, F.I. Shabshina, V.D. Tikhomirov, V.K. Pak, V.I. Shipaev, Yu.V. Vanin, and several other scholars.

During the years of Perestroika, scholars gained the opportunity to openly express their positions. In 1988, V.I. Shipaev published two articles in the popular youth newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda", in which he discussed the socioeconomic and political situation of the Republic of Korea and laid out arguments in favor of establishing cooperation with it⁷. In late October 1988, the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee held two meetings on Korean issues. Scholars from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences—G.F. Kim, Yu.V. Vanin, and V.I. Shipaev—participated. Based on their recommendations, the Soviet leadership decided to establish direct economic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea. F.I. Shabshina's speech in the central Soviet newspaper "Izvestia" in September 1989 on the need to establish relations with the Republic of Korea mutually had a significant public resonance. "Recognition of the South Korea would enhance our international authority, as it is in line with the new political thinking."⁸ Shabshina's position, in more detail, was outlined in an article published in the journal "Problems of the Far East."⁹ Despite disagreements in political circles, diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea were established in September 1990.

Korean studies traditions are passed down from generation to generation. With

⁷ Shipaev V.I. South of the 38th parallel. Komsomolskaya Pravda. May 22, 1988; From silence to contacts. Komsomolskaya Pravda. October 25, 1988.

⁸ Shabshina, F.I. "Is it possible to untangle the 'Korean knot'?" A Soviet scientist's opinion. Izvestia, September 1, 1989.

⁹ Shabshina F.I. Korean reality and Soviet Korean studies. Problems of the Far East. 1990. 2.

the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Korea in 1990, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the beginning of radical political and economic reforms in Russia in the 1990s, not much attention was paid to the development of the DPRK compared to the previous period. Domestic scholars who were engaged in North Korean studies despite the shift in the direction of South Korea: Vorontsov A.V. (The Korean Problem in the System of International Relations from the Mid-80s to the Mid-90s of the Twentieth Century / Tikhomirov V.D. The Korean Problem and International Factors (1945 – Early 80s). Moscow, 1998) and others, being not only outside observers but also direct participants in the transformations taking place in Russian-Korean relations at the time, sparked interest in finding new ways to establish cooperation between Russia and both Koreas.

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2. Life and Work Dedicated to Korea. Volume I. Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004. P. 184.
3. Tikhomirov, V.D. History of Korea (from Ancient Times to the Present). V. 2. M., 1974 (author of sections); 30 years of People's Korea. – International Life. 1975, No. 8; International relations in the Asian-Pacific region at the turn of the 1970-1980s. – Problems of peace and security in Asia. M., 1987. (In co-authorship); The Korean Peninsula in the security system in the Far East. – International relations and current problems of ensuring peace and security in the Far East. Part 2. M., 1988; USSR and Korea. M., 1988. (Author of sections); The Korean problem and international factors (1945 – early 80s). M., 1998.

Is It Korean Studies or Peninsula Policy Research?
Reconsidering the State-Centered Tradition of Russian Korean Studies

Kang Kyung Min (Moscow City Pedagogical University)

A. I. Sharafetdinova's conference paper offers a concise overview of the development of "Korean Studies" in Russia from the late 19'th century to the early 21'th century, focusing on the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). One particularly striking passage is her claim that from Korea's liberation in 1945 until the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea in 1990, Soviet scholars' attention was "mainly focused on North Korea," whereas after 1990 "the Republic of Korea also began to be studied properly." In this way, she presents a broad trajectory from North Korea - centered research to a more "parallel" approach that includes South Korea.

The information provided in the paper is certainly useful. The account that Russian Korean Studies began with encyclopedic undertakings such as *Description of Korea* (Описание Кореи), became institutionalized around RAS during the Soviet period, and expanded its focus after Perestroika provides a helpful framework for surveying the field's historiography. Moreover, A. I. Sharafetdinova is careful introduction of major scholars' careers and accomplishments helps trace the genealogy and accumulation of this research community.

Nevertheless, despite the title indicating a "history" of research at RAS, I find it regrettable that the paper does not move sufficiently beyond a descriptive narrative of research bias and the political nature of knowledge production. In particular, the author treats the structural causes of North Korea-centered research with the phrase "For obvious reasons," emphasizes scholars' policy advising and participation in decision-making, and portrays the post-1990 increase in research on South Korea almost as an unproblematic "scholarly advance." At precisely this point, however, I would like to pose a more fundamental question: Is this "Korean Studies," or rather

“Korean Peninsula policy studies” embedded in state strategy? And within such a research tradition, does the diversity of “Korea” truly appear at all?

1. On Research Bias

A. I. Sharafetdinova writes; “For obvious reasons, the DPRK dominated the socio-political and scholarly work of Korean studies scholars.” This phrasing does more than state an empirical imbalance; it presupposes the cause as self-evident and thereby forecloses further explanation. Yet in historiography, what is deemed “obvious” can function less as an explanation than as an evasion. The author also reiterates that between 1945 and 1990 Soviet scholarly attention was “mainly focused on North Korea.” I think that; If so, a history of scholarship should not merely assert that “this was the case,” but should examine why it had to be the case - or whether it truly had to be so.

This issue is not unique to the Soviet context. Even in South Korea, the autonomy of topic selection, access to materials, scholarly exchange, and the allocation of research funding often remain strongly linked to state interests and international relations - for example, in policy-oriented institutes such as the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP). In this sense, it is difficult to explain a North Korea-centered orientation simply as the outcome of individual scholars’ preferences or academic autonomy. It is more plausible that it reflected a structural consequence of knowledge production in which certain topics were encouraged while others were marginalized. Hence, I would ask: Was the focus on North Korea the result of scholars’ autonomous choice, or the product of a system that institutionally demarcated what could and could not be studied? If this question is avoided, the “history of Korean Studies” risks being reduced - and undervalued - as a history of reactive research driven by external necessity.

2. Scholarly Achievement or State Policy?

A. I. Sharafetdinova emphasizes that scholars at RAS submitted proposals to the highest authorities and influenced policy directions. She notes that scholars

“voluntarily submitted proposals to the highest party and government bodies,” and that “Based on their recommendations, the Soviet leadership decided to establish direct economic relations” with the Republic of Korea.

For the author, such passages likely demonstrate the “impact” of scholarship. From a critical perspective, however, the same evidence can be read as showing how policy entanglement came to shape the academic framework of Soviet/Russian Korean Studies. The fact that scholars influenced decision-making has a double meaning: it may signify practical contribution, but it also suggests that research may have been recognized as “useful knowledge” only insofar as it fit the policy frames demanded by the state—security, diplomacy, and the management of inter-state relations. In such conditions, the causal order can reverse: instead of “scholarship → policy,” we may see “policy needs → scholarly legitimation.” Here I would ask: Is this the language of Korean Studies, or the language of Soviet foreign policy? When policy advising is presented as a core “achievement” of Korean Studies, the field risks being positioned not as an academic effort to understand Korea, but as region-specific knowledge designed to support state strategy.

3. Does the Expansion of South Korea Research Indicate Scholarly Transformation?

A. I. Sharafetdinova states that after 1990 “the situation changed,” and that research began to address South Korea’s economic and political development. Yet the expansion of the research object does not automatically entail an epistemic shift or scholarly innovation. The key question is not merely whether the object changed, but whether the interpretive frame through which Korea was understood also changed.

In the paper, discussions of South Korea are largely situated within state-level frames such as “socioeconomic and political situation” and “direct economic relations.” That is, although South Korea was added to the research agenda, the core focus still appears to be the political-economic system of the state and its external relations. This may suggest not an enhanced multi-layered understanding of Korean society, but rather a reallocation of research objects in response to changes in diplomatic reality.

Was research on South Korea academically “impossible” before normalization, or merely institutionally marginalized? If South Korea research became “full-scale” after 1990, was this due to an internal shift in scholarly problematics, or was it induced by changes in international relations and research infrastructure - access to materials, exchange, and funding? Therefore, instead of naturalizing the growth of South Korea research as “scholarly progress,” I argue that we need to analyze how research agendas were reconfigured within the shifting nexus of diplomacy and institutional change.

4. Where Is “Korea” in This Research?

A. I. Sharafetdinova provides detailed accounts of scholars’ careers, research achievements, and policy involvement; yet this choice also reveals an implicit evaluative standard. For example, Tikhomirov is highlighted for his work within the CPSU Central Committee and his participation in treaty-related processes, while Vanin is noted for his press publications criticizing post-1990 policy errors. In other words, scholarly value appears to be measured less by micro-level understanding of Korean society than by proximity to state policy and institutions.

This kind of research may indeed excel at constructing Korean Studies in terms of the state, the regime, and policy. However, if Korean Studies is to be an academic endeavor to understand “Korea” in a fuller sense, at least the following dimensions should be integrated: everyday life and lived experience; popular culture and shifting social desires; civil society, social movements, and social conflict; gender, generation, and class; histories of memory and emotion (war, division, separation); media and discourse (image politics and opinion formation); regional cultures and linguistic/lifestyle differences between eastern and western parts of the peninsula; and ethnographic/folkloric diversity. Moreover, even prior to the political division into North and South, the Korean Peninsula contained internal regional and cultural differentiation. The Taebaek mountain range, for instance, has long served as a geographic axis along which east–west differences in culture, language practices, and everyday traditions have taken shape. These constitute a “multi-layered” internal

diversity that cannot be captured through a North–South lens alone. If such dimensions remain absent while South and North are compared only as state units, Korean Studies may inadvertently simplify - rather than deepen - our understanding of the peninsula. Thus, I contend that a research-history narrative centered on RAS risks narrowing the scope of Korean Studies excessively.

5. Conclusion

Accordingly, I propose the following thesis: for Russian Korean Studies to gain stronger explanatory power as Korean Studies, it must move beyond enumerating institutional achievements and explicitly examine the political conditions that guided what could be studied and constrained what could not - treating the politics of knowledge production as an object of inquiry. Furthermore, the field needs an expanded research horizon that goes beyond the state-unit division of North and South and incorporates the internal multi-layered dimensions of peninsula society - region, culture, language, everyday life, gender, memory, and media.

I would like to close with the following question: Will Russian Korean Studies continue to remain “peninsula knowledge” that serves policy needs, or will it shift toward a perspective that understands the Korean Peninsula as a complex society?

The Authoritarian Period in the History of the Republic of Korea (1948-1987) in Soviet and Russian Historiography

Alexander Kurmyizov (Institute of Oriental Studies)

Summary

This paper is devoted to the analysis of main theoretical positions of Soviet and Post-Soviet Russian scholars on the authoritarian regimes of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan which governed the Republic of Korea from 1948 to 1987. In Soviet period there was a domination of negative assessments of those regimes due to their anticommunist policy and alliance with the United States. In 1990s approaches to South Korean history have dramatically changed. In Russian historiography policy of Syngman Rhee is critically evaluated because he lost his power as a result of the popular uprising in 1960. But Russian scholars give more positive assessment to Park Chung Hee regarding him as an author of South Korea's economic miracle. Chun Doo Hwan is considered as a successor of Park's socio-economic policy. Russian Korean researchers emphasize that economic achievements of the authoritarian regimes created a firm basis for political democratization of the ROK at the second half of 1980s.

Today the Republic of Korea is a democratic country with a vibrant civil society. But in the period from 1948 to 1987 it was governed by authoritarian political regimes such as governments of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan. On the one hand, it was a crucial period when a poor and agrarian country devastated by Korean war (1950-1953) was able to form the foundations of modern state, carried out full-scale modernization, achieved significant economic growth and strengthened its international position. On the other hand, this period was marked by massive violation of civil rights and liberties and repression of the political opposition. This paper provides an overview of the main works of Russian scholars of both Soviet and post-Soviet eras dedicated to the problems of the socio-political development of the Republic of Korea during the authoritarian period, and aims to demonstrate new approaches and interpretations of this topic.

In Soviet period the attitude of Russian researchers toward authoritarian regimes of South Korea was determined by such factors as the dominance of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Soviet Union, the acute ideological confrontation with the United States during the Cold War, and the specific features of the Soviet foreign policy toward the two Korean states. In our opinion, the most important factor influencing the attitude toward the policies of South Korean governments in that period was the direction of the Soviet Union's "Korean policy." During the Cold War, the Soviet Union undoubtedly prioritized relations with North Korea, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not have diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea until 1990, and the policies of the South Korean governments were viewed with extreme criticism.

This approach was characterized by the following features: an emphasis on the anti-popular, reactionary, and repressive nature of the regimes; accusations against the South Korean leadership of submissive adherence to US interests; downplaying the ROK's achievements in the socio-economic sphere; focusing on the sufferings of the South Korean masses under brutal dictatorship. On the contrary, the development of North Korea was seen as successful and progressive.

From today's perspective, some assessments of specificity and results of socio-economical and political development of the ROK made by Soviet scholars may seem one-sided and simplistic. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the works of Soviet researchers on South Korea contain extensive factual and statistical material. Despite ideologized conclusions, these statistical data provided attentive readers with a generally correct understanding of the economic progress in the South of the Korean Peninsula and the ROK's successes on the international stage.

Views of Soviet scholars on the South Korean political systems were presented in the books of V.M. Mazurov published in 1960-1970s. Assessing internal and external policy of the First Republic in his book "The formation of anti-popular regime in South Korea (1945-1950)" [Mazurov, 1963] he called the first President Syngman Rhee's regime as "anti-popular". Of course this definition was to some extent ideological but the April revolution of 1960 that overthrew Syngman Ree

confirmed the correctness of this assessment. The next work written in association with B.V.Synitsin «South Korea: dramatic crossroads» [Mazurov, Synitsin, 1963] was dedicated to the events after the fall of the Syngman Rhee regime. The authors made a conclusion that the April revolution proved unable to provide a strong, effective impetus for reform efforts. As is well known, after the overthrow of the authoritarian regime of Syngman Rhee, in 1960 there were some attempts to establish a parliamentary democratic republic. However, the military coup of May 16, 1961, put an end to the democratic experiment and led to the establishment of a military-authoritarian regime under the leadership of General Park Chung-hee. The authors concluded that democratic government led by Chang Myon was not able to overcome socio-economic crisis and political chaos in the country because during the Second Republic the conditions for establishing democracy have not been formed. This led to a military coup of 1961 and the establishment of a military dictatorship.

The two-volume work "History of Korea (from Ancient Times to the Present)," published in 1974[History of Korea, 1974], reflected the prevailing Soviet approach to the history of South Korea. The description of the ROK political history from 1945 to early 1970s is contained in the second volume. An undoubted advantage of this collective work was its comprehensive view of South Korea, which combined its political history with its socio-economic and cultural development. From the results of this study the following major conclusions can be drawn:

- 1) The Korean people in South Korea had lost any ability to decide the fate of the country.
- 2) Since the formation of the Republic of Korea in 1948, it had been under the control of the United States and pro-American politicians.
- 3) The U.S. influence and power ambitions of some politicians led to the establishment of dictatorships of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee. The South Korean state was regarded only as an obedient executor of American will and US military base in the Far East.

This typical and simplified approach was also presented in the works of I.S.

Kazakevich [Kazakevich, 1980], B.V. Synitsyn [Synitsyn, 1967], V.A. Marinov, A.V. Torkunov [Marinov,Torkunov, 1979], and other Soviet scholars. The content and conclusions of their works were often subjective and aimed at criticizing the South Korean government. The Park Chung-hee regime was characterized as reactionary, military-bureaucratic, and born of US neo-colonialism [Marinov,Torkunov, 1979]. The anti-national policy pursued by this regime, supported by imperialist forces, was presented in the book as the main reason for the persistence of a tense atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula.

In the mid-1980s, Soviet Korean studies scholars began to partly reconsider some interpretations of South Korea's development. On the one hand, it became possible due to the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika in the USSR and the revision of existing social science concepts. On the other hand, the success of the economic modernization of the ROK was obvious, making it impossible to write about it exclusively in a negative light. The beginning of democratization of South Korea also changed the attitude of Soviet researchers toward the ROK to a more positive one.

It is worth to mention V.I. Shipaev's work, "South Korea in the System of the World Capitalist Economy"[Shipaev, 1986]. It presents an objective and generally neutral analysis of the South Korean export-oriented economic model used by Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes.

Around the same time, V.D. Tikhomirov's monograph, "The Korean Problem and International Factors (1945-Early 1980s)" was written [Tikhomirov, 1998]. A characteristic feature of the author's position was a critical approach to the unification policies of not only the South but also the North, which was a new phenomenon for Soviet historiography. Unfortunately, V.D. Tikhomirov's work was published only in 1998.

"US Neocolonialism and South Korea" written by A.A. Proshin and A.A. Timonin [Proshin, Timonin, 1985] still remains the single monograph in Korean studies in Russia devoted to South Korea during the rule of Park Chung-hee. Although the authors formally followed the accepted assessments of Soviet historiography,

which is reflected in the book's title, they were able to offer a number of new interpretations. In particular, they demonstrated that Park Chung Hee used repressive measures cautiously, preferring to rely on mass mobilization and the implementation of an elaborate socioeconomic policy. Thus, the military regime sought to rely on the support of the South Korean peasantry and was largely successful in this. This work also became the first analysis of political concepts of the Park Chung Hee's regime in Soviet historiography.

Since the early 1990s, a new era in the study of South Korea has begun. Previous ideological restrictions and prohibitions have disappeared, and censorship has become a thing of the past. Archives have been opened, and for Russian researchers access to foreign sources and literature, including South Korean ones, has become significantly easier. The most important change was that Russian scholars were no longer required to adhere to a single, government-approved framework.

In the first half of the 1990s, the overwhelming majority of works by Russian scholars on South Korea focused on two topics: its economic modernization and its international position. The interest of post-Soviet researchers in the South Korean economy is understandable, because in the situation of market reforms in Russia there was an undeniable interest to the successful economic modernization experience of the ROK. South Korea's international position has been one of the most thoroughly researched topics in Russian Korean studies since Soviet times. The issues of South Korea's socio-political development during the authoritarian period were briefly overlooked, but since the second half of the 1990s, Russian researchers have begun to research them. Without claiming to cover a comprehensive list of monographs and articles, we will examine what we believe to be the most significant works on this topic.

The problems of the socio-political development of the Republic of Korea during the authoritarian period are most fully reflected in the works of the prominent Korean scholar of the older generation, V.M. Mazurov. V.M. Mazurov said that the reason of collapse of the Second Republic was an inability of its authorities to resolve the country's socioeconomic problems, as well as the peculiarities of Korean political

culture: "The establishment of dictatorial military rule in the spring of 1961 was facilitated by numerous factors, including the desire to lead the country out of devastation and socioeconomic and political chaos. Furthermore, one cannot ignore the centuries-old authoritarian traditions that developed in the political culture of medieval Confucian Korea. It should be especially emphasized that Confucianism, with its strict hierarchy of authority, preached the legitimacy of only one bearer of supreme power—the monarch—as the 'father of the nation,' whose authority was seen as a guarantee of stability and national well-being; opposition activity, however, was actively rejected by adherents of Confucian canons "[Mazurov, 1996 (3), p.21].

Another article by V.M. Mazurov, "Political Leadership in Multi-Confessional South Korean Society," was the first work in Russian Korean studies devoted to the influence of religious factors on the socio-political processes taking place in the south of the Korean Peninsula. The facts presented in the article confirmed the author's idea of a close connection between religious forces in South Korea and its political forces and social movements. In particular, the role of many Christian church leaders—Catholics and Protestants—in the anti-dictatorship movement was demonstrated. V.M. Mazurov also described in detail the political context that emerged after the assassination of Park Chung-hee. Specifically, he pointed out that supporters of public administration reforms grouped around the new leader of the state, Choi Kyu-ha. The latter attempted to raise the issue of "revising government priorities, limiting the excessive influence of the military in all areas of state activity, introducing civil society norms, and developing a legitimate mechanism for the transfer of power" [Mazurov, 1996 (2), p.190]. But a section of the military, led by General Chun Doo-hwan, opposed the changes and finally seized power by force [Mazurov, 1996 (2), p.191-192]. Chun Doo-hwan's coup and the bloody suppression of the Gwangju uprising led to the failure of political democratization in 1980.

Among works from the 1990s, the most comprehensive study of the issues of democracy and dictatorship in South Korea was provided by V.M. Mazurov's monograph, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy (The Practice of South Korea and the Philippines)." In it, the author identified similarities and differences in the

democratization processes of the two Asian countries. While Soviet historiography emphasized the anti-popular and repressive nature of the military regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, this work offered a more positive assessment of the military's activities. V.M. Mazurov emphasized that under their rule South Korea became one of Asia's "newly industrialized countries" and a model of dynamic socioeconomic development. Policies of the military regimes led to a significant increase in the material well-being, achievements in education and culture [Mazurov, 1996 (1), p.62].

V.M. Mazurov also highly appreciated the role of the South Korean army and elite in ensuring the non-violent nature of the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime: "The ruling political forces... promptly sensed that authoritarian structures no longer functioned as required... South Korean policy was shaped by a group of brilliant technocrats who carried out structural preparations for the introduction of a civilized market... An integral element of South Korea's evolution was the "curtailment" of the army's role in political life... Its withdrawal from the political sphere did not lead to a catastrophe largely due to the army's dual role – both as a support for the regime and as a factor actively influencing governance processes... It signified the end of the phase of violent balancing of the interests of various segments of the population,... but not the breakdown of governance institutions, the administrative structures of the state, and other aspects of society's life... The solution to the complex problems of the transition period was accompanied by special support for socially vulnerable segments of the population through state programs. All this sufficiently ensured political stability and state security" [Mazurov, 1996(1), p.189-191].

In the 2000s, an important trend of Russian Korean studies was appearance of general works on the history of Korea. The most interesting for our topic are "The Course of Lectures on Korean History from Ancient Times until the End of the Twentieth Century" by S.O. Kurbanov [Kurbanov, 2002] and "The Korean Peninsula. Metamorphoses of Postwar History" by A.V. Torkunov, V.I. Denisov, and V.I.F. Lee [Torkunov, Denisov, Lee, 2008]. The authors offered a number of new assessments

and interpretations of key events in the history of South Korea during the authoritarian period. Soviet historiography gave an unequivocally negative assessment of the historical role and personal qualities of Rhee Syngman. While critically assessing the rule of Syngman Rhee, Kurbanov also noted that, firstly, it was during this period that the first popular uprising in South Korea against the government occurred, marking a new stage in its national and political maturity of Korean society. Secondly, it was during this period, despite the country's generally dire economic situation, that large corporations (chaebols) were established, which became the foundation for South Korea's subsequent economic breakthrough [Kurbanov, 2002, p.464-465]. The authors of "The Korean Peninsula: Metamorphoses of Postwar History" went even further, drawing attention to the duality of the first South Korean leader: "As an individual, he was undoubtedly a Korean patriot and made a significant contribution to the anti-Japanese liberation struggle. But as a politician, especially as president of South Korea, he slid into authoritarianism and dictatorship, unleashing unjustified repression against his own people" [Torkunov, Denisov, Lee, 2008, p. 219]

The next authoritarian leader, Park Chung-hee, was also heavily criticized by Soviet Orientalists. Like Syngman Rhee, he was accused of suppressing democratic institutions, repressing the opposition and dissent, and pursuing US geopolitical interests. S.O. Kurbanov demonstrated the ambiguity of Park Chung-hee. On the one hand, he offered a negative assessment of the dictatorial manifestations of his power. It is well known that in 1972, President Park Chung-hee adopted the new Yusin Constitution, which effectively guaranteed him lifelong and unlimited power. S.O. Kurbanov gave the following assessment: "Thus, at the end of 1972, the so-called 'dictatorship of reform' (yusin tokjae) and the de facto 'eternal power' (yeongu jipkwon) of President Park Chung-hee were established in South Korea". At the same time, he rightly pointed out the fact that "despite the establishment of a harsh and terrible dictatorship, which South Koreans still remember with horror, the force of resistance to it was so great that ultimately, in combination with the aforementioned objective reasons, it was able to crush it" [Kurbanov, 2002, p.501-502].

At the same time, the author gave a very positive assessment of Park Chung-

hee's socioeconomic policies. In particular, he noted that two months after the military came to power, in July 1961, the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan for 1962-1966 was published. At the same time, Economic Planning Council was created. S.O. Kurbanov viewed introduction of economic planning as one of the factors behind the country's economic breakthrough [Kurbanov, 2002, p.506-507]. It should be noted that almost all Russian scholars have positively assessed Park Chung-hee's practical steps in the economic sphere. The attitude toward Park himself as the architect of the South Korean economic miracle has become more positive compared to the Soviet era.

The Fourth Republic of South Korea, established after the adoption of the new Yusin Constitution, is traditionally viewed in Russian historiography as a time of harsh authoritarianism and dictatorship. In this regard, it is interesting that the authors of "The Korean Peninsula: Metamorphoses of Postwar History" offered an openly positive assessment of the role of the Yusin system in Korean history, something unimaginable in Soviet historiography. They wrote: "The Yusin doctrine played a tremendous mobilizing role in implementing the fundamental ideals of the 'military revolution.'" The lofty and noble goals of modernization, revival, and progress in the second half of the 20th century were also proclaimed by other military-bureaucratic regimes (Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, and others). But only in South Korea (and perhaps partially in Chile) the military-bureaucratic regime was able to achieve such impressive, world-class economic and social achievements. The success of the "military revolution" in South Korea can only be explained by the fact that its leaders managed to consolidate all the key objectives of the "economic miracle" within a single framework, based on a distinctive ideology [Torkunov, Denisov, Lee, 2008, p. 268]. The term "authoritarian modernization in action," used by the authors in relation to Park Chung-hee's regime, suggests a generally positive assessment of its role in Korean history. At the same time, the book pays little attention to the negative aspects of Park Chung-hee's rule, such as the repression of political opponents or the suppression of the labor movement.

Russian Korean scholars also view the Chun Doo-hwan regime (the Fifth Republic) in two ways. On the one hand, they acknowledge that it was an era of

dictatorship, repression, suppression of dissent, and an active pro-democracy movement. They don't ignore the negative aspects of Chun Doo-hwan's rule, including his rise to power through a military coup, the bloody suppression of popular demonstrations in Gwangju, and the restriction of political freedoms. They note such achievements of Chun Doo-hwan's policies as the increased international prestige of the Republic of Korea, facilitated by the hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games, as well as a number of economic measures, including price stabilization, import liberalization, and the liquidation of unprofitable enterprises [Kurbanov, 2002, p.528-529].

Another trend in Russian historiography of the authoritarian period of the ROK's history has been the growth of publications devoted to specific aspects of South Korean socio-political development during that era. Various aspects of this issue are examined in the works of D.A. Samsonov [Samsonov, 2002, p. 125-136] and A.S. Prozorovsky [Prozorovskiy, 2009].

D.A. Samsonov's articles analyze the reasons for the introduction of the Yusin system. He cited several factors: the weakening of US military involvement in Asian affairs after the proclamation of the "Guam Doctrine" in 1969, the military threat from the North, and the opposition's successes in parliamentary and presidential elections [Samsonov, 2002, p. 128-129]. In another article devoted to an analysis of the Yusin constitution, D.A. Samsonov emphasizes the internal preconditions for the introduction of Yusin. In his opinion, the Park Chung-hee government's course of modernization entailed increasing production rates, which required intense labor on the part of the population. The growth of protest sentiments since the late 1960s and the opposition's successes in presidential and parliamentary elections testified to popular discontent. Ultimately, the president decided to create a system that would allow him to remain in power indefinitely [Samsonov, 2005, p. 161]

A.S. Prozorovskiy's work examines the role of two authoritarian leaders—Suharto and Park Chung-hee—in the modernization of Indonesia and South Korea, respectively. To characterize Park Chung-hee's regime, Prozorovsky uses the term "modernizing authoritarianism." Drawing on extensive factual material, he

demonstrates that, at a certain stage of modernization, an authoritarian regime can be effective in addressing economic and social challenges. At the same time, "by successfully addressing issues of economic and social development, it gradually erodes the foundations of its own existence. As economic progress progresses, strata of society emerge that become less dependent on the government, begin to demand a reduction in its control, and are granted political rights. In other words, such authoritarianism creates the preconditions for a movement toward democratization"[Prozorovskiy, 2009, p.23] Another Russian scholar, A.N. Lankov, shares a similar view, defining Park Chung-hee's regime as a "dictatorship of development." He also points out that "all 'developmental dictatorships' shared one characteristic: economic success inevitably undermined their political base. As prosperity grew, educational levels rose and a middle class emerged—and this was inevitably followed by political change" [Lankov, 2013, p.84]

One indication of the growing interest of Russian historiography in the history of the Republic of Korea during its authoritarian period is the emergence, since the beginning of the 21st century, of a number of studies attempting to provide an objective analysis of the official ideology of the authoritarian regimes of the Republic of Korea, something that was impossible in Soviet Korean studies. In particular, the ideology of the regimes of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee is examined in detail in the works of I.A. Tolstokulakov, one of the leading contemporary Russian Korean scholars [Tolstokulakov, 2007]

The ideological policies of South Korean authoritarian regimes, as well as the characteristics and ideological essence of the anti-dictatorial protest movement, are examined in detail in E.M. Ermolaeva's monograph, "The Republic of Korea in the Authoritarian Period: Ideology, Power, and Society" [Ermolaeva, 2021] In addition to the ideological concepts of the regimes of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee, the monograph analyzes the official ideology of the Chun Doo-hwan regime. The author concludes that the official ideologists aimed not only at preserving the regime but also at mobilizing the masses to achieve national goals. Although a number of ideological principles aimed at justifying strong power remained unchanged, the ideological

policy of the South Korean authorities during this period, according to the author, was distinguished by a certain flexibility: "The ideological doctrines of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics were united by the authorities' desire to preserve traditional values, form a 'Korean version' of the socio-political system, and ensure national unity." However, in the process of development of the state, ideology moved away from abstract ideals to the objective realities of the time and the demands of society" [Ermolaeva, 2021, p.192]

K.V. Asmolov's work, "Korean Political Culture: Traditions and Transformation"[Asmolov, 2017] contains an analysis of South and North Korean political systems. The author analyzed the role of authoritarianism in the history of the ROK. He rightly pointed out that "The South Korean experience also provides an important example of the relationship between democracy and modernization: we cannot escape the recognition that a forced exit from the crisis is impossible without a certain tightening of the screws. But the most such methods of governance can provide is a sharp breakthrough, after which it is necessary to move on to other methods of resolving the crisis. Delay risks degeneration into dictatorship, and military methods of governance outside of an emergency are as unacceptable as civilian methods during a war or acute social crisis" [Asmolov, 2017, p. 677]

Thus, it can be concluded that the issues of government-society relations, as well as the ideological policies of the authoritarian regimes of South Korea from 1948 to 1987, are attracting the attention of Russian historians. In post-Soviet era Russian historiography has evolved from the ideological, often one-sided assessments characteristic of Soviet Korean studies to more balanced and objective ones. South Korean history has come to be largely perceived through the prism of the "Korean economic miracle." Syngman Rhee's rule is viewed rather negatively in Russian historiography. This is entirely natural, given the collapse of his regime following a popular uprising, which was caused by growing dictatorial tendencies coupled with the absence of a positive socioeconomic program. At the same time, Russian Korean studies scholars tend to offer cautiously positive assessments of the military-bureaucratic regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, citing their

contribution to the transformation of South Korea from a backward and agrarian country into a highly developed and prosperous one. Without denying the dictatorial nature of these political regimes, Russian researchers emphasize not the repressions but the modernizing thrust of their policies. This is particularly true of Park Chung-hee, who is considered the architect of the "Korean economic miracle." Russian scholars point out that South Korea's economic achievements from the 1960s to the 1980s paved the way for the emergence of civil society in South Korea and the transition to democracy in the late 1980s.

At the same time, it's worth noting that not all aspects of South Korea's authoritarian regimes have been studied equally in Russian historiography. For example, Russia currently lacks studies of the political biographies of South Korean leaders in the mid- and late 20th century- Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and others. It is hoped that new studies based on new archival materials and scholarly works will emerge in the near future.

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Discussion

Discussion on “The Authoritarian Period in the History of the Republic of Korea (1948–1987) in Soviet and Russian Historiography”

Jang Jin Ho (GIST)

**The Evolution of Orthodoxy in Korea Based on Archival Materials
(The Holy Synod of the Russian Empire and the Archives of the Foreign
Policy of the Russian Federation)**

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In the Russian academic community, the history of Orthodoxy in Korea occupies an important place in the study of the country's religions. This is based on Russia's centuries-old connection with the Orthodox tradition, which fuels interest in the spread of Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula. Scientific studies on the stages of the development of Orthodoxy in Korea were published in the early 20th and early 21st centuries, indicating a continued interest in the subject. During the Soviet period, no work on this issue was published, but there were scientific observations and studies. The purpose of the speaker's presentation was to study the formation and development of Orthodoxy in Korea during the 20th and 21st centuries, identify the characteristic features of the approaches of various scientists to this subject and analyze the evolution of Russian Orthodoxy on the Korean peninsula in the early 20th and early 21st centuries based on available sources.

One of the first investigation work on Russian Orthodoxy in Korea was "Russian Spiritual Mission in Japan and Korea" by F. Prokhorenko, a student at the Imperial Kharkov University in 1906. Prokhorenko also wrote about the situation with Orthodoxy in Korea, relying primarily on the Russian missionary priests who organized and guided the work of mission—Father Chrysanth (Shchetkovsky) and Father Pavel (Ivanovsky) about their work of spreading Orthodoxy among the Koreans.

The next work worth noting is that of Father Feodosy (Perevalov), the head of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea from 1917 to 1930. His book "Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea (1900-1925) ", published in 1926, covers the first 25 years of the existence of the Russian mission, mentioning the first attempt to organize the mission before 1900.

The subject of Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula was revisited during the Soviet era in the 1989 collection of articles "Russian Orthodoxy: Milestones in History". This work mentions the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea, whose missionary work since 1897 was characterized rather critically, and whose results were portrayed as rather meager, in comparison to the far more active missionary work among Koreans who had resettled in the Russian Far East.

The subject was subsequently examined by A. I. Petrov, a candidate of historical sciences in his 1995 article, "The School of Culture and Morality: The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea; 1897-1917: A Brief Historical Essay". He devotes attention to the study of the Korean language by missionaries for communicating with their flocks, explaining the essence of the Orthodox faith to them, and for working with church

The article "Patriarch of the Orthodox Church in Korea Archimandrite Chrysanth (1869–1906): His Deeds and Times" of the Tatyana Simbirtseva focuses on the work of the first head of the mission Father Chrysanth (Shchetkovsky) in spreading the Orthodox faith among Koreans, including his efforts in organizing missionary work.

It's also worth noting 1993 article of the Archimandrite Avgustin (Nikitin) "The Russian Orthodox Mission in Korea", where he quotes another member of the mission, psalm-reader Ion Levchenko about the impact of the Confucian upbringing, that contains prescribed the performance of all possible ceremonies, the Koreans became orthodox through participation external spiritual services.

The findings of this article contrast with the 2000 historiographic article "On the Centenary of Orthodoxy in Korea" by the T. Simbirtseva. The article notes the observation of a political motive for the organization of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea by researchers. The article also notes the serious difficulties faced by head of the mission, Polycarp (Priymak), including his conflict with one of its ministers in the final years of the existence of the mission, supported by schismatic Orthodox Archbishop and expulsion by the Korean authorities. The article also notes the acceptance of the Orthodox community in South Korea, devastated by the Korean

War, into the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the mid-1950s and the work of the Greek missionaries.

In an article by renowned Korean scholar, St. Petersburg State University lecturer, and PhD in history, S. Kurbanov "The Russian Orthodox Church in Korea," it is mentioned that the mission survived the devastating Korean War, which resulted in the complete destruction of its entire spiritual infrastructure. At the same time, during the war, Greek military chaplains were stationed in Seoul as part of the UN chaplaincy force. The article concludes by noting that, despite the end of the Russian Orthodox period and the beginning of the Greek Orthodox period in 1975 with the arrival of Father Sotirios in South Korea, evidence of the existence of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea remained in South Korea until the 1990s.

Another clergyman who contributed to the study of the modern period of religious history in Korea is Father Dionisy Pozdnyaev. He is the author of the article "K istorii Rossijskoj duhovnoj missii v Koree (1917—1949)" ["On the History of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea (1917—1949)" – in Russ.], which covers the activities of the Russian mission after the revolution and before its suppression by the South Korean authorities. In the article, Father Dionysius noted the repeated attempts by the White émigré Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in the 1930s to establish control over the mission through two priests which failed due to several circumstances.

If we look at the materials of the Holy Governing Synod, the following situation emerges: firstly, Russian Orthodox missionary work took place on the Far Eastern lands, where the Koreans were located. Secondly, after 1900 this continued in the Korea itself. Moreover, some of the initiatives, attempted by the Russian missionaries received support from the Russian Government, but they were not implemented for a number of reasons.

Regarding materials from the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archives pertaining to the organization of an Orthodox parish in the DPRK, the following can be noted. Firstly, as early as 2000, the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang expressed its opinion on the need to utilize the church factor to develop ties of Russia with the DPRK, which had been severed since 1991. It is also worth noting the attention of the

highest-ranking church officials of the Russian Orthodox Church to the organization of an Orthodox parish in Pyongyang for what one of the clergymen was sent to Pyongyang to explore the possibility of establishing an Orthodox parish in the capital of the DPRK.

In 2002, after the Chairman of the National Défense Commission of the DPRK visited the Russian Far East, he expressed his intention to build an Orthodox church in Pyongyang. This idea led to a diplomatic meeting between representatives of the church and a delegation from the Society of Religionists of the DPRK, and one of the items to discuss with them the construction of an Orthodox church in Pyongyang was planned. In a letter to Kim Jong-Il, the Patriarch himself, although welcoming the decision to build the church. The role of former Russian Ambassador to Pyongyang Andrei Karpov deserves special mention for he had been a contact who transmitted the projects for the construction of the temple by the North Koreans to the representatives of the church and assisted in organizing and conducted the visit of the Russian Orthodox Church delegation to the foundation stone ceremony, for what Clergymen were thankful to him.

It is also important to note the information "on the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church in the DPRK" presented at the 2005 6th meeting of the working group on interaction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Orthodox Church, where the following events and questions were discussed and considered. Furthermore, a rather important compromise decision was reached regarding the status of the Orthodox community in the DPRK – autonomy under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Of particular note is the letter from Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov, dated September 5, 2006, after the consecration ceremony of the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity. In this letter, in addition to thanking the Foreign Minister for his assistance in organizing and conducting the visit, the Metropolitan notes the significant support of the Orthodox faith in the DPRK from believers in Russia, as well as the importance of the attention of the Russian Ambassador to the DPRK and other diplomatic staff to the activities of

the DPRK Orthodox Committee and the support at the diplomatic level at the Foreign Ministry for the desire of Russian representatives and their families to participate in daily services at the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity. Finally, the Metropolitan asks that his wishes be conveyed to Andrei Karpov successor in the office of Ambassador of Russia to the DPRK.

To summarize the above investigation, the following can be said:

1. Research into Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula has undergone a long period of development, with the exception of a long period when this subject was not widely covered;

2. Active research into Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula can rightfully be considered to have begun only in the late 1980s, when this subject was first broached and then comprehensively developed in subsequent years: scholarly works have appeared devoted to specific details, periods, or individuals related to Orthodoxy in Korea;

3. Regarding the materials of the Holy Governing Synod that addressed the subject of Korea, it should be noted that the spread of Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula through the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission found support from government bodies of the Russian Empire (including the Holy Governing Synod, which was not a spiritual organization but a government agency), which considered it part of state foreign policy;

4. Regarding materials from the Russian Foreign Policy Archives concerning Orthodoxy in North Korea, it can be noted that this subject was already being developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early 2000s, when Russia and North Korea began to draw closer after a nearly 10-year hiatus, and the idea of establishing an Orthodox parish in North Korea was perceived as an integral part of strengthening influence;

5. At the same time, one cannot forget the role of the Russian Orthodox Church, which also explored the possibility of establishing an Orthodox parish in North Korea and actively collaborated on this matter with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Embassy in North Korea, who exerted a truly

significant influence on the implementation of this task. It also collaborated with the North Korean leadership, which proposed the idea of building an Orthodox church in Pyongyang and implemented it. North Korean religious organizations, including the Union of Believers of the DPRK and the Orthodox Committee of the DPRK, formed during this process, acted as a bridge between the leadership of this country and the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church.

6. And at last despite the fact of late coming to the Korean Peninsula, insufficient support due to the historical events and organization conditions on the ground, and also the presence of stronger religion confessions and antagonistic attitude to the Russian Orthodox mission from different Powers and their Authorities, the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea has left its own mark in the history even after it was replaced by Greek Missionaries, and the legacy of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea led to the resumption of activity of the Russian Orthodox Church on the Korean peninsula, in addition to its northern part.

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Archimandrite Chrysanth (1869–1906): His Deeds and Times" – in Russ.] // Christianity in the Far East. Part I. Vladivostok, 2000. P. 160–16.

Discussion on “The development of Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula Based on Archival Materials”
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Kim Mu Gyeom (Moscow State University)

The objective of this presentation is to make a methodological scholarly contribution by offering a systematic analysis of the development of Orthodoxy in Korea as a research topic within Russian academia, drawing on both primary sources and subsequent scholarly research. In particular, the presentation offers a multidimensional analysis of the relationship between the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission, state power, and foreign policy. By examining the growth and reconfiguration of Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula from the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century as a continuous historical process, it seeks to demonstrate how patterns of continuity emerge within an overall framework of historical discontinuity, thereby elucidating the dynamics between rupture and persistence.

Perhaps the greatest strength of this study lies in the fact that it moves beyond a mere enumeration of previous scholarship and advances toward a genuinely comparative and analytical examination of the problematics and interpretive approaches adopted by individual scholars. The materials demonstrate convincingly that early research on Orthodoxy in Korea was largely grounded in internal missionary accounts, but gradually developed toward interpretations that incorporated political as well as diplomatic contexts. The identification of the Soviet period as a phase of scholarly silence, followed by a rapid resurgence of interest from the late 1980s onward, marks an important turning point in the historiography of this subject.

Another significant contribution of the presentation is its integration of materials from the Holy Governing Synod with those from the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation. This approach demonstrates that the development of Russian Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula was not merely a religious endeavor,

but was also embedded within imperial practices and state foreign policy. From this perspective, Orthodox missionary activity is redefined beyond the simple propagation of faith and understood instead as a political, diplomatic, and ideological enterprise.

As a discussant, I would like to raise several points for further consideration. First, while the analysis based on Russian archival sources and scholarship is methodologically robust, it also inevitably reflects a Russia-centered perspective. Most of the sources examined in the presentation were produced by Russian clergymen, diplomats, or scholars. As a result, the religious experiences of Korean believers themselves, their motivations for accepting Orthodoxy, and local societal responses to Orthodoxy remain relatively underexplored. How does the presenter assess this limitation inherent in the source base, and what possibilities does the presenter envision for addressing this imbalance in future research—for example, through engagement with Korean-language sources or dialogue with Korean religious historiography?

Second, the relationship between Orthodox missionary activity and competing religious traditions on the Korean Peninsula warrants further problematization. Although, as the presenter has noted, some studies point to affinities between Confucian ritual culture and Orthodox liturgical practices, these observations remain incomplete. A comparative approach that incorporates Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, and Confucian traditions may help to elucidate the structural and socio-religious conditions that constrained the diffusion of Orthodoxy in Korea. Does the presenter consider it possible to expand this line of inquiry through comparative religious or social-historical perspectives, and if so, in what direction?

Third, the interpretation of the revival of Orthodoxy in North Korea raises important questions. As the presentation compellingly demonstrates, the construction of the Orthodox church in Pyongyang resulted from cooperation among the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the North Korean leadership. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether this process should be understood primarily in religious terms or rather as a symbolic and diplomatic project. Does the presenter view the Pyongyang Orthodox church chiefly as a space of genuine religious

life, as a diplomatic and symbolic instrument, or as a complex phenomenon in which both dimensions coexist?

Finally, one of the most important theoretical contributions of this presentation lies in its argument that the legacy of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Korea has not simply disappeared, but has been transformed and, in certain respects, continues into the present. This perspective encourages a reconsideration of Korean Orthodox history not as a narrative of missionary failure, but rather as a history of constrained yet enduring forms of continuity. From this standpoint, how would the presenter propose to rethink the history of Orthodoxy on the Korean Peninsula—and beyond it—outside the binary framework of success and failure?

In conclusion, this paper offers a valuable reframing of the historiographical literature on Orthodox studies in Korea and calls for a reassessment of Orthodoxy's position at the intersection of religion, politics, and diplomacy. If the issues raised here are further developed in dialogue with regional history, comparative religious studies, and international relations, this line of research promises to attain greater analytical depth and scholarly significance.

THE THIRD MOSCOW INTERNATIONAL
RUSSIA-KOREA CONFERENCE

Session 2

Current Trends in Russian Studies in Korea

Moderator : Natalia Kim
(Moscow State University)

Research Trends on the History of Russian Economic Thought in Korean Academia and the Implications of New Methodological Approaches: Focusing on the Study on the Soviet Mathematical Formalism in Economics
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Kim Dong Hyuk (GIST)

I. Preface

This study aims to elucidate the process by which a new field of economic research, known as mathematical economics, became established in the Soviet Union, as well as the influence it exerted. Economic theory held a particularly unique status in the Soviet Union. In particular, there was a highly complex relationship between economic theory and rapid shifts in economic policy. It consistently became a major political issue and functioned as a driving force behind socioeconomic transformations. This was evident in the case of War Communism during the Civil War, as well as in the great debates surrounding the continuation of the New Economic Policy and collectivization during the 1920s.

The “mainstream” political economy theory established in the Soviet Union is known as Marxist-Leninist political economy and is often referred to as Stalinism when it encompasses broader social phenomena. Regardless of the nomenclature, Soviet mainstream economics was formulated between the late 1920s and the 1930s and was closely tied to the political and social objectives of the time, as well as to the debates and political upheavals that accompanied them. Soviet mainstream political economists are generally understood to have focused their efforts on the theoretical critique of modern capitalism while simultaneously extending Marxist economic analysis to construct a “socialist political economy.” Their work concentrated on areas such as formulating the objective economic laws of socialist development and exploring the relationship between value and socialist price formation.¹

¹ Michael Alexeev, Clifford Gaddy and Jim Leitzel, “Economics in the Former Soviet Union,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 6:2 (1992), pp. 142-143.

Due to the political atmosphere of the time and the highly centralized nature of economic decision-making, the topics addressed in economic literature during the 1930s and 1940s were largely limited to specific elements of the centralized economic system, narrowly defined technical subjects, particular issues of individual economic sectors, or explicitly interpretive theoretical generalizations within Marxist political economy. In contrast, fundamental questions concerning the functioning of the system were difficult to discuss.²

However, even after the 1930s, there continued to be currents within Soviet economics that deviated from the mainstream Marxist-Leninist political economy tradition. These alternative approaches not only persisted within the academic field but also influenced economic management in the Soviet Union. Following Stalin's death, the shifting balance of power and broader structural transformations across the socialist bloc—including within the USSR—brought about a complex set of changes. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Soviet Union entered yet another phase of significant transformation, and one of the primary driving forces behind this shift was the evolution of economic theory within Soviet academia—most notably, the rise of Soviet mathematical economics.

Research on the Soviet school of mathematical economics was primarily conducted during the 1970s and 1980s by scholars such as A. Zauberger, A. Katsenelinboigen, P. Sutela, G. Feiwel, and M. Ellman. These studies mainly addressed the formation and characteristics of this school from a history-of-economic-thought perspective. Despite the historical limitations of the period, they paid attention to the heterogeneous and reformist nature of Soviet mathematical economics. However, these works tended to define Soviet mathematical economics through a binary lens of orthodoxy versus heresy, or conservatism versus reform, which presents a significant limitation.

More recent scholarship has sought to overcome this dichotomy through more detailed and empirical research, attempting to reinterpret the significance of Soviet

² Feiwel, *The Soviet Quest for Economic Efficiency*, p. 57.

mathematical economics not only within the Soviet context but also within the broader framework of global intellectual culture. Notable among these are the works of Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik.³ The most significant contribution of this recent body of research lies in its demonstration that Soviet mathematical economics, while not identical to its Western counterpart, was nonetheless part of an international intellectual current. It existed along a continuum between two poles: the institutional and intellectual framework of the discipline of “economic cybernetics” and a more decentralized, Western-style approach based on “mathematical economic methods.”⁴

In contrast, they argue that neither “economic cybernetics” nor the “latent neoclassical” strand succeeded in forming a clearly defined academic discipline. Transnational intellectual exchange remained extremely limited, and these approaches failed to produce an independent theoretical discourse situated between Marxist political economy and mathematical optimization.⁵ They also point out that Soviet mathematical economics failed to develop an autonomous theoretical discourse in which mathematical modeling itself serves as both the starting point and the aim of interpretation. While mathematical modeling does not carry fixed normative meaning and can be employed as a tool for various economic interpretations, in the Soviet context, such interpretive autonomy was not sufficiently secured.⁶

I find their research highly meaningful and agree with many of their arguments. Nevertheless, there remains much to uncover regarding the formation of a distinct Soviet culture of mathematical economics and its socio-economic and institutional influence. To address this gap, it is essential to investigate the development of the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI)—the central institution of Soviet mathematical economics from the 1960s onward—as well as to analyze the academic

³ Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik, "The cultures of mathematical economics in the postwar Soviet Union: More than a method, less than a discipline," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 63 (2017); "On (im)permeabilities: Social and human sciences on both sides of the 'Iron Curtain'," *History of the Human Sciences* 29, 4-5 (2016); "General equilibrium theory behind the iron curtain: The case of Victor Polterovich," *History of Political Economy* 46-3 (2014).

⁴ Ivan Boldyrev and Olessia Kirtchik, "The cultures of mathematical economics in the postwar Soviet Union," p. 3.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

and social networks of its researchers. This paper serves as a starting point for such an investigation.

II. Change Patterns of Research Trends of CEMI through the analysis of the Journal “*Economics and Mathematical Methods*” published by CEMI

The Soviet school of mathematical economics, which was highly distinct from the "mainstream" Marxist-Leninist political economy of the USSR, gradually expanded its influence within Soviet economic academia and planning authorities from the late 1950s onward. In particular, the establishment and subsequent activities of the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI) marked a critical turning point in the transformation of Soviet economic thought. To understand these changes, it is essential to examine the shifting research trends within Soviet economics more broadly.

As mathematical economics gained traction within economic research institutions, a corresponding shift in research trends became evident—most notably, in the increasing number of economics journals. The number of specialized economic journals published by central bodies such as the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the Academy of Sciences rose from 16 in 1950 to 53 by 1975.⁷ Between 1961 and 1965, new journals emerged that focused specifically on mathematical economics and cybernetics, such as *Economics and Mathematical Methods* (Экономика и математические методы) and *Problems of Cybernetics* (Проблемы кибернетики).

Moreover, as shown in the table below, leading economic journals of the time, such as *Planned Economy* (Плановое хозяйство) and *Problems of Economics* (Вопросы экономики), began to publish articles on mathematical economics and economic cybernetics from the mid-1950s, with a noticeable increase during the 1960s. These journals were typically viewed as dominated by abstract discussions rooted in Marxist ideology and historical materialism, with little space for

⁷ Sutela, *Socialism, Planning and Optimality*, p. 85

mathematical or technical content.

Table 1. Annual Number of Articles on Mathematical Economics and Economic Cybernetics Topics⁸

※ Reference: Planned Economy and Problems of Economics - All issues from 1950 to 1965.

Year	Planned Economy					Problems of Economics				
	Mathematics, Computing Technology, Cybernetics	Capital Investment / Efficiency of New Technology Adoption	Value and Price	Material Incentives	Total Number of Articles per Year	Mathematics, Computing Technology, Cybernetics	Capital Investment / Efficiency of New Technology Adoption	Value and Price	Material Incentives	Total Number of Articles per Year
1950	0	0	1	0	43	0	1	0	0	137
1951	0	0	1	0	52	0	1	1	0	137
1952	0	0	1	0	53	5	2	5	0	141
1953	0	0	2	0	57	0	1	1	0	138
1954	0	1	0	0	57	0	0	4	2	139
1955	0	3	0	0	56	0	0	1	1	170
1956	0	7	1	0	47	0	3	9	0	179
1957	0	8	4	0	120	1	5	21	1	231
1958	0	7	8	0	121	1	10	15	1	232
1959	1	15	2	1	137	3	14	14	10	259
1960	3	24	5	0	150	4	12	17	3	248
1961	3	23	3	2	151	11	12	17	2	257
1962	4	18	11	9	170	11	20	2	7	243
1963	11	19	23	9	207	15	12	5	10	227
1964	14	11	15	11	228	20	12	8	21	238
1965	10	11	11	13	222	12	7	3	15	249

What becomes evident here is, first and foremost, the significant increase in the overall number of economics articles in 1957. Planned Economy changed from being a bimonthly publication to a monthly journal in that year, while Problems of Economics began publishing around 250 articles annually from 1957 onward. This indicates a surge in theoretical economic discussions during this period. Moreover, articles related to mathematical economics and economic reform began to increase from 1958, with a sharp rise observed after 1960–61. Notably, from 1961, Problems of Economics introduced a dedicated section titled “Application of Mathematics to

⁸ Donghyuk Kim, “The Growth of the Mathematical Economics School and the Transformation of Soviet Economic Academia (1957–1965): Focusing on Changes in Research Institutions and Media,” *Western Historical Review* 125 (2015), p. 116.

Classification Criteria – Keywords and content related to mathematical economics (linear programming, application of mathematical methods to economics, use of electronic computing technology); content related to the economic efficiency of capital investment and new technology (efficiency coefficients, efficiency of fixed capital and capital use, comparison of investment alternatives); content on value and price (calculation of commodity costs, imposition of turnover taxes, profit accounting, etc.); and content on material incentive systems for enterprises and workers (performance-based criteria to improve enterprise profitability, standards for providing material incentives to workers, etc.).

Economics,” which regularly featured articles on mathematical economics. See *Problems of Economics*, issues from January 1961 onward.⁹

However, the mathematical economics research published in these existing journals had its limitations. Although a trend can be observed, the number of such articles remained relatively small, and while they reflected theoretical aspects of Soviet mathematical economics, highly technical or detailed studies were rare. A decisive turning point in this trend was the establishment of CEMI of the USSR. Following its founding, CEMI launched its own academic journal, *Economics and Mathematical Methods*, in 1965. Through this publication, previously underrepresented discussions in mathematical economics began to flourish. According to “Журнал ‘Экономика и математические методы’ в эпоху Н. П. Федоренко (1965-1985 гг.)”(Э. Ф. Баранов)¹⁰, a significant portion of the articles in *Economics and Mathematical Methods* focused on mathematical topics related to optimization methods, including linear, nonlinear, and discrete programming, as well as game theory. These articles illustrate that many specialists had begun applying mathematical optimization techniques not only at the national economic level but also to planning and management processes in specific industries, regions, production units, and enterprises.¹¹

III. Quantitative Growth and Development of Organizational Structure at CEMI

Based on the laboratory for the application of statistical and mathematical methods to economics, established under the leadership of Nemchinov within the USSR Academy of Sciences, CEMI was officially founded in 1963. The changes in the scale of the institute from its inception to 1988 are as follows.

⁹ Refer to issues of *Problems of Economics* published from January 1961 onward.

¹⁰ Э. Ф. Баранов, “Журнал ‘Экономика и математические методы’ в эпоху Н. П. Федоренко (1965-1985 гг.),” *Экономика и математические методы* 54:3 (2018), p. 142.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967		1982	1983	1985	1986	1987
Total Personnel	47	119	236	449	613	842	~	1107				
Researchers	32	107	147	309	342	521		700	719	718	467	465
Ph.D.	6	19	27	54	74	137		258	276	276	178	177
National Doctor	3	4	4	4	6	16		50	49	62	53	56

Table 2. Changes in the Number of Research Personnel at CEMI¹²

As shown in this table, the number of researchers at the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI) steadily increased from 1963 to 1985. The sharp reduction in size after 1986—nearly by half—was due to the separation of several departments from CEMI to form a new institution, the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technological Progress of the USSR Academy of Sciences (IEP NTP). Approximately half of CEMI's personnel were transferred to this new institute. Despite this structural reorganization, the overall trend during this period reflects the quantitative growth of mathematical economics research institutions in the Soviet Union.¹³

A closer examination of the researchers' areas of specialization further reveals the broader research orientation of CEMI. Following the institute's rapid organizational expansion in 1965–1966, there was a noticeable increase in both the number and proportion of scholars specializing in mathematics and mathematical economics within the broader field of economics.

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967		1981	1982	1986	1987
Economics - Mathematical Economics	20	49	92	153	246	359	~	498	518	530	323
	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	222	322		341	352	348	N/A
Mathematics and Mathematical Physics	7	14	24	48	66	104		125	125	116	94

Table 3. Areas of Specialization of Researchers at CEMI¹⁴

Additionally, Table 3 provides an indirect indication of the growing academic authority of the institute within both the fields of economics and mathematics, as seen in the increasing number of Doctors of Sciences (higher doctorates) at the institute

¹² АПАХ ф. 1959, оп. 1, д. 19, 30, 48, 76, 111, 222, 920, 966, 1107, 1142, 1185.

¹³ АПАХ ф. 1959, оп. 1, д. 1142, л. 9.

¹⁴ АПАХ ф. 1959, оп. 1, д. 19, 30, 48, 76, 111, 222, 920, 966, 1107, 1142, 1185.

from its founding through 1987. Furthermore, examining the fluctuations in the number of Communist Party members among the researchers offers some insight into the institute's rising status within the Soviet power hierarchy.

IV. Social Network Analysis on the Researchers at CEMI through Their Careers

This section applies social network analysis (SNA) to the career trajectories of researchers affiliated with CEMI in order to clarify the institute's position within the broader Soviet academic, administrative, and military knowledge system. While previous studies have primarily examined Soviet mathematical economics through intellectual history or methodological comparison, this chapter shifts the focus to the social circulation of expertise—that is, how researchers entered CEMI, how they moved within and beyond it, and how CEMI functioned as a node linking multiple institutional domains. Through this analysis, I aim to demonstrate the patterns of dissemination and consolidation of CEMI, as well as its academic tendency toward mathematical formalism.

1. Data and Methodological Approach

The analysis is based on reconstructed career data of CEMI researchers, including information on source institutions (inflow), positions held within CEMI, part-time affiliations, trainee pipelines and destination institutions after transfer or exit (outflow). To avoid inflating network density, internal movements within CEMI were excluded from inflow/outflow calculations, and duplicate records were removed. The resulting dataset allows for a longitudinal reconstruction of personnel flows from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s.¹⁵

Rather than treating careers as linear progressions, SNA enables the identification of structural patterns: concentration of recruitment, asymmetries between inflow and outflow institutions, clustering around specific positions, and the


¹⁵ АРАХ ф. 1959, оп. 1, д. 76, 111, 152, 186, 222, 261, 306, 352, 405, 453, 512, 569, 619, 685, 750, 820, 920, 966, 1107, 1142, 1185.

relative permeability of CEMI's boundaries. This approach makes it possible to conceptualize CEMI not merely as an academic institute but as an intermediary hub within the Soviet political-economic knowledge apparatus.

2. Inflow Networks: Recruitment and Institutional Origins

The inflow analysis reveals a highly uneven recruitment structure. A small number of elite institutions - most notably Moscow State University and research institutes affiliated with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR - accounted for a disproportionately large share of incoming researchers. This concentration indicates that CEMI did not emerge as an alternative or marginal institution but was deeply embedded within the core of Soviet academic hierarchies.

The temporal distribution of inflow further demonstrates that recruitment peaked during the late 1960s and early 1970s, coinciding with both CEMI's rapid organizational expansion and the broader push to incorporate mathematical methods into economic planning. The declining inflow after the mid-1970s suggests a transition from extensive growth to institutional consolidation. Importantly, the inflow network exhibits limited diversity in source institutions, underscoring the selective permeability of CEMI: access was largely restricted to candidates already socialized within elite scientific environments.



3. Internal Positions and Career Structuring within CEMI


An examination of positions held by incoming researchers shows a strong clustering around junior researcher, engineer, and senior engineer roles, with relatively fewer direct appointments to senior research positions. This pattern reflects CEMI's function as a training-cum-research institution, where mathematical economists were expected to acquire both technical expertise and institutional experience before advancing.

Career flow analysis from first to final position confirms a relatively stable internal hierarchy. The majority of researchers entered at junior or engineering levels and advanced incrementally, while only a limited number reached top administrative or laboratory leadership positions. This structure suggests that CEMI emphasized collective research capacity over individual prominence, reinforcing its role as a planning-oriented institute rather than a site of theoretical entrepreneurship.

4. Part-Time Affiliations and Cross-Institutional Embeddedness

One of the most distinctive features revealed by the network analysis is the prevalence of part-time employment. A significant number of CEMI researchers simultaneously held positions at universities, sectoral research institutes, or applied planning organizations. These affiliations were especially common with higher education institutions, indicating that CEMI served as a bridge between research, teaching, and policy application.


The density of part-time networks increased notably during the 1970s, suggesting that mathematical economists trained at CEMI were increasingly in demand across the Soviet knowledge economy. Rather than signaling institutional weakness, this permeability points to CEMI's growing authority: its researchers circulated outward while maintaining formal ties to the institute, effectively extending CEMI's influence beyond its organizational boundaries.





5. Trainee Pipelines and Reproduction of Expertise

The trainee inflow analysis highlights the structured reproduction of mathematical economic expertise. Most trainees originated from a small set of institutions closely aligned with mathematics, cybernetics, and economics within the Academy of Sciences system. The conversion rate from trainee to full employee - approximately one quarter - indicates a selective but institutionalized pipeline.

CEMI Trainee Inflow Analysis (All Years)




of Sciences of Tajik SSR




6. Outflow Networks: Transfers, Exit, and State Integration

The outflow analysis reveals a striking asymmetry between academic and non-academic destinations. While some researchers transferred to other research institutes or universities, a substantial portion moved into state planning bodies, military institutions, and applied research organizations. The prominence of the state planning bodies and research organizations as a destination is particularly noteworthy, underscoring the strategic value attributed to mathematical optimization and systems analysis.

This pattern suggests that CEMI acted not only as a research center but also as a personnel reservoir for the Soviet state, supplying technically trained experts for domains where economic calculation intersected with security and governance. The temporal peak of outflows in the early 1970s corresponds with heightened interest in systems analysis and large-scale optimization within both civilian and military planning.



CEMI Institution Network Top 30 Inflow + Top 25 Outflow Institutions



7. Interpreting CEMI as a Network Hub

Taken together, the SNA results challenge interpretations of Soviet mathematical economics as either a marginal reformist enclave or a failed attempt at disciplinary modernization. Instead, CEMI emerges as a central node in a distributed network linking academic research, higher education, economic planning, and state administration.

CEMI's significance lay less in producing autonomous economic theory than in organizing the circulation of mathematical expertise across institutional domains. Its researchers were neither isolated intellectuals nor simple technocrats; they were mobile actors embedded in overlapping networks of science, policy, and power. From this perspective, the limited theoretical autonomy of Soviet mathematical economics appears not as a failure but as a structural consequence of its institutional success.

8. Implications for the Study of Soviet Economic Knowledge

By foregrounding careers and networks, this chapter complements intellectual and methodological analyses of Soviet mathematical economics. Social network analysis reveals how institutional design, recruitment patterns, and career mobility shaped the possibilities and limits of economic knowledge production in the Soviet Union. CEMI functioned as an infrastructural institution - one that translated mathematical methods into usable forms for governance, while simultaneously reproducing the social structures necessary for their continued application.

This perspective invites a reconsideration of Soviet economic thought not as a closed ideological system but as a dynamic configuration of institutions, people, and practices, operating under specific political constraints yet capable of significant internal differentiation.

V. Conclusion

This paper examined the rise of Soviet mathematical economics through the institutional development and social networks of the Central Economic Mathematical

Institute (CEMI), situating the institute within the broader Soviet academic, administrative, and military knowledge system. Moving beyond approaches centered on intellectual genealogy or methodological comparison, the study has emphasized the social circulation of expertise—the concrete pathways through which mathematical economists were recruited, trained, positioned, and redeployed across institutional domains.

The analysis of journal publications demonstrates that the diffusion of mathematical economics preceded the institutional consolidation of CEMI, but remained fragmented and limited in scope until the institute's establishment and the launch of *Economics and Mathematical Methods*. CEMI provided not only an organizational base for mathematical research but also a stable platform for the systematic reproduction of mathematical formalism in economics. The quantitative growth of personnel, the increasing share of mathematically trained researchers, and the rising number of senior scholars all indicate that CEMI rapidly acquired academic authority within Soviet economics.

Social network analysis further reveals that CEMI functioned as a central hub linking universities, research institutes, planning agencies, and military-related organizations. Researchers entered CEMI through diverse institutional channels and often circulated between CEMI and external bodies, both during and after their tenure. These patterns suggest that CEMI was not an isolated academic enclave but an infrastructural node within a broader knowledge regime that connected economic theory, technical expertise, and state governance. The institute's role in training young researchers and absorbing trainees into long-term positions underscores its function as a mechanism for the institutional reproduction of mathematical economics.

Taken together, these findings clarify the dual process of dissemination and consolidation of Soviet mathematical economics. Mathematical formalism spread across journals, institutions, and applied domains, while simultaneously becoming consolidated within CEMI as a dominant academic orientation. Rather than forming an autonomous discipline detached from Soviet ideological and administrative

constraints, mathematical economics at CEMI was embedded in a dense network of institutional relations that shaped both its possibilities and its limits.

By foregrounding careers, institutional mobility, and network structures, this paper contributes to a more sociologically grounded understanding of Soviet mathematical economics. It suggests that the significance of CEMI lies not only in its theoretical output but also in its role as a knowledge-organizing institution that stabilized mathematical formalism within the Soviet system. More broadly, the study demonstrates the value of combining social network analysis with historical inquiry to illuminate how scientific and economic knowledge was produced, circulated, and institutionalized during the Cold War.

**Discussion on “Research Trends on the History of Russian Economic
Thought in Korean Academia and the Implications of New
Methodological Approaches”**

Natalia Matveeva (Institute of Oriental Studies)

Promotional Corps for Peaceful Coexistence: Soviet Buddhist Delegation Visits to Asian Countries in the Khrushchev's Era

Kwon Kyung Taek (Pusan National University)

I. Introduction

“We are all disciples of the Great Buddha, united in our efforts to achieve the noble goal of bringing happiness to humanity and ensuring peace for all nations.”

This statement was delivered by Eshi Dorzhi Sharapov (reigned 1956–1963), the 18th Pandito Khambo Lama, who led the Soviet Buddhist delegation to the Fourth Congress of the World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB).¹ This conference, held in Kathmandu, Nepal, from November 15 to 21, 1956, commemorated the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's Parinirvana. In his speech, Sharapov emphasized that Soviet Buddhists, together with their fellow Buddhists in Asia, were active participants in the shared effort to avert the threat of nuclear war and to achieve world peace.

The Cold War, which began with the launch of the European Recovery Program - commonly known as the Marshall Plan - in June 1947, intensified further during the 1950s, manifesting itself in a nuclear arms race centered. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Asian countries that had experienced European colonial rule advocated world peace amid fears that rivalry between Western and communist blocs would give rise to a new form of domination. These concerns were articulated more clearly at the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in 1955. In this international political circumstance, the Soviet Union abandoned the Stalin-era thesis that war and revolution were inevitable and instead adopted the view that peaceful coexistence with the Western bloc was possible, shifting its strategy toward non-military forms of competition. As part of this policy, Soviet authorities actively participated in international Buddhist activities, seeking to cultivate friendly relations with Asian

¹ ГАРБ, ф. Р-248, оп. 1, д. 3703, л. 2.

countries. Ultimately, this emphasis on global peace efforts aimed at expanding the influence of the socialist bloc.

Drawing on materials from the State Archive of the Republic of Buryatia (Государственный архив Республики Бурятия), this study seeks to demonstrate that the Soviet Buddhist delegation's visit to South and Southeast Asia played an important role in publicizing the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence during the Khrushchev era. Having recognized the growing aspirations for peace among Asian countries that became fully articulated in the wake of the Bandung Conference, the Soviet Union sought to approach South and Southeast Asian states by presenting itself as a country that had rejected nuclear war and armed conflict and instead pursued peace. Soviet Buddhist delegation was dispatched in this context. Through their Asian visits, members of these delegations conveyed to Buddhist leaders across Asia that the teachings of Buddha were not fundamentally different from the Soviet commitment to peaceful coexistence. This highly focused diplomatic outreach strengthened ties and friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Asian Buddhist countries.

II. The Early History of the World Fellowship of Buddhists

The WFB, which remains active to this day, was founded in 1950 and provided the institutional platform through which the Soviet Union was able to make its debut on the international Buddhist stage. Among the key figures in the organization's early history was Gunapala Malalasekera (1899–1973), a Sri Lankan Buddhist scholar and diplomat of Sinhalese origin. He received his secondary education at St. John's College in Panadura, a city in western Sri Lanka, and subsequently earned a bachelor's degree as an external student at the University of London, where he studied Greek and Western philosophy.

Despite his academic training in Western civilization, Malalasekera came to believe that it was incapable of resolving the problems confronting the modern world. Instead, he held that such challenges could only be overcome through solidarity and

unity among Buddhists who actively practiced the teachings of the Buddha.² In 1940, he advocated a Buddhist reform movement grounded in the ideals of Humanistic Buddhism and met the Chinese monk Taixu (太虛), who was promoting the reformation of Buddhism and the establishment of a global Buddhist organization. This encounter proved decisive in leading Malalasekera to commit himself to the creation of an international Buddhist organization.

Although the process of founding such an organization was temporarily delayed by the outbreak of the Second World War and the pressing issue of independence from British rule in the postwar period, concrete plans emerged in December 1947 at the 28th General Conference of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress. The participants unanimously resolved to establish the WFB and to invite representatives of Buddhist communities from around the world to Ceylon three years later, in 1950. The purpose of the congress was to facilitate the exchange of information among Buddhists from different countries and to explore ways in which Buddhists, gathering together, could work towards world peace and happiness.³ Through such efforts, members believed that by 1956 - the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's Parinirvana - the global adoption of the Buddha's way of life could help realize peace and well-being throughout the world. To prepare for this undertaking, the organizing committee appointed Malalasekera and the Sri Lankan surgeon W. E. A. Fonseka as co-chairs, thereby initiating the establishment of the World Fellowship of Buddhists in earnest.

The First Congress of the WFB was held from May 25 to June 6, 1950, in Colombo, the capital of Ceylon, and in the ancient city of Kandy. Organizers initially anticipated the participation of 30 to 40 Buddhist figures from fifteen countries; however, at the opening ceremony, 129 Buddhists representing twenty-nine countries were present.

By the conclusion of the congress, the participants had adopted fifteen

² Eugene Rodgers Swanger, "The World Fellowship of Buddhists 1950 to 1966 C. E. Unitive and Divergency Factors in a Buddhist Quest for Unity" (Ph. D. Dissertation, The University of Iowa, 1971), pp. 169-170.

³ *Report of the Inaugural Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists* (Colombo, 1950), p. 1.

resolutions related to the organization's activities and roles. Among these, the thirteenth resolution focused on issues of peace. It declared that, in order to advance toward world peace, brotherhood, and universal love, Asian Buddhist countries need to pursue economic, political, and cultural integration.⁴ The resolution further called upon other Buddhist countries to support this endeavor and resolved to develop the WFB into an international organization akin to the United Nations. At this time, the intensifying military tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union made solidarity among Asian Buddhists - many of whom had experienced Western colonial rule since the late nineteenth century - appear increasingly unavoidable. Accordingly, Malalasekera, who held the teachings of Buddha in the highest regard, believed that these teachings offered a means to overcome the various crises confronting the world. He firmly believed that the WFB could play a pivotal role in addressing these challenges and in bringing about happiness and peace for humanity.⁵

Under Malalasekera's leadership, the belief that the teachings of Buddhism could serve as a remedy for global problems began to be reflected in real diplomacy by the mid-1950s. A notable example was the meeting between the premiers of China and India, Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru, held in New Delhi in 1954, where discussions on peaceful coexistence took place. On this occasion, the Buddhist Five Precepts served as a fundamental basis for their agreement. China subsequently reaffirmed its commitment to the implementation of these principles at the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia the following year.⁶

The Bandung Conference marked a decisive turning point in the Soviet Union's stance toward Buddhism. Bringing together representatives from twenty-nine Asian and African countries, the conference adopted declarations advocating world peace and cooperation, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-racism, and neutrality in the Cold War. Leading figures of the so-called Third World - Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno, and Gamal Abdel Nasser - rejected the paths proposed by both Moscow and

⁴ Ibid, p. 86.

⁵ Swanger, "The World Fellowship of Buddhists," pp. 173-174.

⁶ Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, 2007), p. 112.

Washington and instead pursued independent courses of action. In this context, the Soviet Union sought to secure their support by more clearly articulating the policy of peaceful diplomacy it had advanced in the post-Stalin era.⁷ The Soviet commitment to world peace was articulated explicitly at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, widely known for Nikita Khrushchev's "Secret Speech." There, the Soviet leadership officially abandoned the notion of inevitable, imminent war and instead began to actively promote a new policy premised on the possibility that the capitalist and communist blocs could coexist peacefully through non-military competition.⁸

III. The Debut of Soviet Buddhism to the International Stage: Visits to Nepal and India in 1956

The policy of peaceful coexistence through Buddhism was spearheaded by the Central Spiritual Administration of Buddhists of the USSR (Центральное духовное управление буддистов СССР, hereafter the TsDUB). By dispatching a Soviet Buddhist delegation to the Fourth Congress of the WFB, this institution sought to demonstrate not only that the Soviet Union shared the peace-oriented aspirations of Asian countries, but also that it was willing to participate actively in the pursuit of world peace.

The delegation - composed of Pandito Khambo Lama Sharapov, his deputy Zhambal-Dorzhi Gomboev, and the Mongolist Sandzhe Dylikov - departed from Moscow on November 9, 1956, traveled via India, and arrived in Kathmandu, Nepal, where the congress was held. Their journey extended beyond the congress into January 1957, and included pilgrimages to major Buddhist sites in India.

Beginning with the Fourth Congress of the WFB in 1956, the three Soviet Buddhist representatives undertook regular visits to South and Southeast Asia until Sharapov's passing in 1963. With the backing of the TsDUB, they joined Buddhist communities in South and Southeast Asia in their efforts to promote world peace,

⁷ Ivan Sablin, "Soviet and Buddhist: Religious Diplomacy, Dissidence, and the Atheist State, 1945-1991," *The Journal of Religion* 99 no. 1 (2019), p. 48.

⁸ Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, p. 94.

prevent nuclear war, and pursue arms reduction, thereby serving as diplomatic envoys who fostered international solidarity between the Soviet Union and countries of these regions.

On the day following the opening of the Fourth Congress, Sharapov ascended the podium to sustained applause from the participants and delivered a report on the state of Buddhism in the Soviet Union. He noted that Buddhist populations were distributed across the country, particularly in the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Republic, Chita and Irkutsk Oblasts, and Tuva. Among these regions, the Buryat Republic had long occupied a prominent place as one of the principal centers of Buddhism in Russian history.

Soviet religious repression had long been widely known among Buddhist figures in Asia, and through his speech Sharapov sought to dispel external suspicions that the Soviet authorities not only failed to permit religious tolerance but also actively suppressed religious practices and customs. Such efforts were a necessary precondition for securing recognition of the Soviet Union as a legitimate partner for dialogue among leading figures in Buddhist countries across Asia. Sharapov informed the audience that the Soviet Constitution guaranteed religious activity and permitted its people freedom of belief.⁹ He emphasized that religious belief was a private matter, that state power was separate from religion, and that the state did not interfere with believers in performing diverse religious rituals and ceremonies. Whether this misinformation conveyed by the Soviet Buddhist leader reflected his own voluntary interpretation or was imposed by the government cannot be determined on the basis of the archival materials currently available. Nevertheless, given that the overseas activities of Soviet Buddhist delegations were conducted under the auspices of the TsDUB, it is difficult to imagine that official state perspectives were not reflected in his statements.

The central thrust of Sharapov's address lay in underscoring the congruence between Soviet policy and Buddhist values in the pursuit of world peace. In his

⁹ ГАРБ ф. Р-248, оп. 1, д. 3703, лл. 2-3.

narrative the Bolshevik government had struggled since the October Revolution to promote peace throughout the world and to advance the welfare and prosperity of numerous peoples. As part of this effort, it had proclaimed freedom of religion and belief, thereby guaranteeing the diverse religious traditions practiced by all nationalities within the Soviet Union. Buddhism was no exception. Sharapov further stressed that the policies of the socialist state - aimed at preventing war, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, and establishing brotherhood among all peoples - were fully compatible with Buddhist ideals.¹⁰ By contrast, he pointed out that in certain countries reactionary groups were active, attempting to instigate new and destructive wars while obstructing the independence and freedom of other nations.¹¹ In such a critical moment, he argued the struggle to defend peace, by necessity, had to be unified. In this sense, aspirations for peace and the pursuit of humanity's happiness and well-being constituted a faithful adherence to the Buddha's teachings of, and Sharapov sought to demonstrate at the congress that the Soviet Union was endeavoring to act in accordance with these principles. His speech consequently attracted considerable attention from the participants.

The congress resolved that, in order to preserve and strengthen peace among nations, weapons of mass destruction such as atomic and hydrogen bombs must be banned, and that Buddhists of all countries needed to unite in their efforts to embrace the Five Principles of Peace based on the Five Precepts. This resolution received unanimous support from the participants. Attendees also noted this unity required the integration of the diverse Buddhist traditions, with particular emphasis placed on overcoming divisions between the two major branches - Mahayana Buddhism and Theravāda Buddhism.

The most significant difference from previous congresses was the participation, for the first time, of Buddhist delegations from socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and China. As a result, the proceedings featured speeches that either aligned with or opposed Marxist communism, a contrast to earlier gatherings. In the

¹⁰ ГАРБ ф. Р-248, оп. 1, д. 3703, л. 4.

¹¹ ГАРБ ф. Р-248, оп. 1, д. 3703, л. 2.

end of his address, Sharapov argued that one of the central principles of socialism and communism was the abolition of exploitation of human beings by one another, as well as the elimination of class inequality and discrimination based on religion, ethnicity, and gender. He emphasized that these goals lay at the core of socialist ideology and were not incompatible with the teachings of Buddhism.¹²

By consistently emphasizing that the fundamental values pursued by the Soviet Union were not at odds with Buddhist teachings Sharapov and his associates sought throughout the congress to cultivate personal ties with leading figures in Nepal and to promote amicable relations between the two countries. In a series of meetings with prominent Nepali officials - including Prime Minister Tanka Prasad Acharya, who had played a crucial role in establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in July 1956, as well as King Mahendra Vira and the Minister of Defense - they once again underscored the Soviet commitment to world peace and the advancement of humanity's well-being. Among the foreign delegations, Sharapov's group was the first to meet with the Dalai Lama's official representative and the representative of Nepali Buddhists. At this meeting, the latter characterized the Soviet delegation's visit as having strengthened friendly relations with Nepal and expressed a favorable attitude toward the communist state. In addition, the Soviet delegation attended a public gathering organized by the municipal authorities of Kathmandu, where they extended wishes of prosperity to the Nepali people who welcomed them and emphasized the importance of fostering friendly relations between the two countries.¹³ By engaging not only with senior government officials but also with the general public, the Soviet delegation sought to advance bilateral relations. After visiting major Buddhist sites in Nepal, including Lumbini, the birthplace of Buddha, the delegation departed for Delhi, India, on November 22.

There, from November 24 to 29, a symposium of Asian and European Buddhists was held under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and Burma's second prime minister, Ba Swe. In his address,

¹² Swanger, "The World Fellowship of Buddhists," p. 262.

¹³ ГАРБ ф. Р-248, оп. 1, д. 3703, л. 5.

Nehru remarked that two forces existed in the world: one that sought armament for war, and another that aspired to the triumph of democracy and peace. Under such circumstances, he argued, all Buddhists had a duty to join in the effort to eradicate the forces of war.¹⁴ Nehru's commitment to peace thus closely aligned with the objectives articulated by the Soviet Union at the Fourth Congress of the World Fellowship of Buddhists. As a result, Nehru and the Soviet delegation exchanged cordial greetings in a warm and amicable atmosphere.

Meanwhile, the delegation sought to alleviate the concerns of other Buddhist countries by engaging with them in India and addressing their apprehensions regarding religious conditions in the Soviet Union and the prospect of war. On December 1, a dinner meeting typical of this effort was held at the Soviet Embassy in India between the Soviet chargé d'affaires to Ceylon and the Soviet Buddhist delegation. The chargé d'affaires noted that he had previously visited the Soviet Union to participate in peace-related conferences and remarked that he was well acquainted not only with Buddhism but also with the Russian Orthodox Church. His experiences had fostered a favorable view of the Soviet Union, and in an effort to dispel Ceylonese doubts about religious conditions within the USSR, he requested that copies of Sharapov's speech delivered in Kathmandu be sent to him.¹⁵

IV. Conclusion

Initiated in 1956 as a means of disseminating the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, Soviet Buddhist delegations' visits to Asian countries continued into the Brezhnev era. Although the delegation led by Sharapov was dissolved following his passing in 1963, his successor as the 19th Pandito Khambo Lama, Gomboev, organized a new delegation and maintained regular visits to Buddhist countries in Asia throughout the 1970s. While the range of destinations expanded to include Japan and Mongolia, the overarching slogan of world peace promoted by the delegations remained unchanged.

¹⁴ ГАРБ ф. Р-248, оп. 1, д. 3703, л. 6.

¹⁵ ГАРБ ф. Р-248, оп. 1, д. 3703, л. 8.

Diplomatic engagement through Buddhism also became more proactive in the 1960s. In parallel with overseas tours by Soviet Buddhist delegations, the Central Spiritual Administration began, from 1961 onward, to invite delegations from Asian Buddhist countries to the Soviet Union. These visits, centered on Ulan-Ude, included tours of religious and economic facilities. Through visits to religious institutions—most notably the Ivolginsky Datsan—Buddhist delegations from across Asia came to recognize that communities maintaining Buddhist practices continued to exist within the Soviet Union and that the authorities did not suppress such practices. Visits to collective farms, glass factories, and meat-processing plants in the Buryat Republic further demonstrated that regions preserving Buddhist ways of life could undergo modernization under socialism, thereby encouraging Buddhist countries in Asia to view socialist ideology as compatible with their own traditions. Taken together, these developments illustrate that Buddhism functioned as a major strategic instrument of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War.

Discussion on “Promotional Corps for Peaceful Coexistence: Soviet Buddhist Delegation Visits to Asian Countries in the Khrushchev’s Era”

Alexander Vorontsov (Institute of Oriental Studies)

Results and Prospects of the Studies on the Soviet Economy and Its Management System in South Korea

Ko Kwang Yeol (Yonsei University)

I. Introduction

Academic interest in the Soviet economy and its management system in South Korea entered a new phase following the end of the Cold War. Particularly since the 2010s, emerging scholars have expanded research across diverse topics including the theoretical foundations of the Soviet economy, foreign relations, and economic management reforms. This study examines major papers published by several Korean historians to assess research trends in Soviet economic studies within Korean academia and to project future research directions. These researchers have made significant contributions to elucidating the complex nature of the Soviet economy through empirical research based on primary sources from Russian and former Soviet archives. Through this analysis, I can identify the achievements and current position of Korean scholarship and anticipate future academic developments.

II. Soviet Economic Research: Mathematical Economics, Economic Reform Theory, and the History of Economic Thought

Kim Donghyuk has conducted systematic research from 2015 to the present, focusing on the theoretical development of Soviet economics. His research concentrates on demonstrating that Soviet economics was not merely confined to Marxist-Leninist dogmatism but achieved distinctive theoretical development to solve practical economic problems.

He conducted important research systematically analyzing the formation process of the mathematical economics school that emerged in Soviet economic circles after the late 1950s, revealing that the Soviet mathematical economics school was not simply an imitation of Western neoclassical economics but rather the product of independent theoretical development aimed at solving actual problems in the Soviet

economy. He identified that three pioneers of the mathematical economics school—V. Nemchinov, L. Kantorovich, and V. Novozhilov—despite having different academic backgrounds and problem consciousness, all shared the common goal of solving problems of balance and efficiency in the Soviet economy through mathematical methodology. Nemchinov, as an economic statistician, raised issues regarding the construction of national economic balance sheets; Kantorovich, as a mathematician, developed linear programming in 1939 while solving optimal resource allocation problems at a plywood factory; and Novozhilov, as an economist, researched the measurement of capital investment efficiency and optimal investment allocation. Kim demonstrated that the theoretical development of Soviet economics was endogenous development originating from the concrete needs of the Soviet economy rather than simple importation of Western theory.¹

In subsequent research, Kim analyzed how the mathematical economics school established its institutional foundation and expanded its influence in Soviet economic circles from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. He revealed that the establishment of a mathematical economics laboratory at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1957 and the founding of the Central Economic Mathematical Institute (TsEMI) in 1963 provided the institutional foundation for mathematical economists to conduct official academic activities. In 1964, a specialized academic journal was launched, becoming a major platform for publishing mathematical economics research, and existing mainstream economic journals also began publishing mathematical economics papers from the early 1960s. He assessed that mathematical economists were able to have significant voice in the 1965 economic reform debate because this institutional foundation had been established. He also noted that from the late 1950s, a new generation of young economists and mathematicians began participating in mathematical economics research, and with the introduction of computers in the Soviet Union, the technical foundation for actually performing complex mathematical economic calculations was established, concluding that the combination of theoretical

¹ Kim, Donghyuk, “The Beginning of the Soviet Mathematical Economic School,” *The Historical Journal* 84 (2015): 129-82.

innovation, institutional foundation, generational change, and technological development enabled the mathematical economics school to grow into an important force in Soviet economic circles in the 1960s.²

Kim analyzed the Kosygin reform implemented in the early Brezhnev period from a long-term and systematic perspective. He divided the process leading to the 1965 reform into three stages. The first stage (1962-1964) was the theoretical debate stage during the Khrushchev period, when a full-fledged economic reform debate began after Kharkov University Professor Evsei Liberman published an article titled “Plan, Profit, and Bonus” in *Pravda* in September 1962, proposing the introduction of profit as a performance indicator for enterprises. The second stage (1964-1965) was when the reform plan materialized after the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime took office; after Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964 and Kosygin assumed the premiership, he officially announced the economic reform plan in September 1965. The third stage (1965-1966) was the implementation phase, when the new system was experimented with in pilot enterprises and gradually expanded. The core content of the reform included strengthening enterprise self-accounting, introducing profit and sales as main performance indicators, expanding the discretionary power of enterprise management, and improving the price system. He assessed that this reform was the product of economic problems accumulated since the late 1950s and theoretical discussions about them, demonstrating traces of serious contemplation by Soviet economic circles and policymakers on improving economic efficiency.³

Kim also analyzed in greater detail the debate within economic circles that unfolded after Liberman’s 1962 proposal. The Liberman debate was not simply a pro-con debate about introducing profit indicators but included fundamental theoretical issues such as the role of the law of value in socialist economies, the relationship between planning and markets, and methods for measuring economic efficiency. He revealed that three positions confronted each other in this debate. Conservatives

² Kim Donghyuk, “The Growth of the Soviet Mathematical Economic School and the Change within the Academia of Economics in the Soviet Union (1957-1965),” *The Western History Review* 125 (2015): 92-123.

³ Kim Donghyuk, “The 1965 Soviet Economic Reforms: Its Theoretical Background and Procedure (1962-1966),” *Journal of History and Culture* 54 (2015): 173-212.

argued that profit indicators introduced capitalist elements and violated socialist principles, emphasizing the superiority of central planning; moderate reformers argued for introducing profit indicators but using them restrictively within the framework of central planning; and radical reformers argued for more extensively introducing market mechanisms and reducing the role of central planning. The debate resulted in the adoption of the moderate reformers' compromise: the 1965 reform introduced profit indicators but maintained the basic framework of central planning, and while enterprise autonomy was expanded, many indicators were still handed down from the center. He argued that the Liberman debate created intellectual space for public discussion of economic efficiency and market mechanisms, which became the theoretical foundation for economic reform discussions during the perestroika period.⁴

Kim analyzed price theory and policy, one of the core issues in Soviet economics. How to determine prices in a socialist economy was a very important issue both theoretically and practically; he revealed that from the mid-1950s onward, debates on price theory unfolded among economists, with core issues being whether prices should reflect only production costs or also consider factors such as supply and demand and scarcity, and how to allocate the roles of the center and market in price determination. Kim emphasized that mathematical economists played an important role in price debates during this period; Kantorovich and Novozhilov proposed the concept of "objectively determined valuations," arguing that resource scarcity should be reflected in prices, which was in fact similar to Western economics' marginal utility theory or shadow price concepts but was justified within the socialist theoretical framework. With the 1965 economic reform, comprehensive reorganization of the price system was pursued, wholesale prices were substantially adjusted, and capital costs were partially reflected in addition to production costs; however, Kim pointed out that price reform was implemented incompletely, many prices remained distorted, and energy and raw material prices in particular were artificially kept low, causing

⁴ Kim Donghyuk, "The 'Liberman Debate' in the Soviet Economics Academia and Its Consequences," *The Korean Historical Review* 236 (2017): 413-50.

resource waste.⁵

He also conducted unique research analyzing how cybernetics theory was received and transformed in the Soviet Union. While early Soviet Union criticized cybernetics as “bourgeois pseudoscience” and rejected it, from the mid-1950s onward, as the need for scientific and technological development grew, cybernetics was reevaluated, and Soviet scientists sought to apply cybernetics to economic planning, industrial management, defense systems, and other areas. Soviet theorists sought to use cybernetics as theoretical justification for rationalizing and scientizing socialist planned economies, conceptualizing central planning as one giant control system and arguing that improving information flow and feedback mechanisms would enhance economic efficiency. However, he assessed that the actual impact of cybernetics on economic management was limited; the cybernetic approach remained at a theoretical level due to limitations in information processing capacity, the difficulty of reducing complex economic reality to simple models, and bureaucratic resistance, but he concluded that cybernetics discourse introduced new ways of thinking to Soviet economics and management science and contributed to reconceptualizing economic problems through the concepts of information and control.⁶

III. Soviet Foreign Relations: Economic Exchange with the West and Economic Cooperation with North Korea

Research on the external aspects of the Soviet economy has proceeded in two main directions. One is economic exchange between the Soviet Union and Western capitalist countries, and the other is economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and socialist countries, particularly North Korea.

Kim analyzed changes in Soviet-Western trade relations during the first decade of the Cold War. He revealed that Soviet-Western trade was not completely severed even in 1947-49; in particular, Western European countries sought to maintain trade

⁵ Kim Donghyuk, “The Debate on Pricing and Change of Pricing Policy in the Soviet Union (1956-965),” *Chonnam Historical Review* 63 (2016): 275-309.

⁶ Kim Donghyuk, “The Adoption and Transformation of Cybernetics in the Soviet Union: From a Scientific Theory to the Discourse on Management of Society,” *The Historical Journal* 91 (2017): 349-88.

with the Soviet Union for economic pragmatism despite American pressure, and Britain, France, Italy and others continued trade importing raw materials from the Soviet Union and exporting manufactured goods, with trade gradually beginning to increase after Stalin's death in 1953 as Soviet peaceful coexistence policy and Western European economic interests converged. He characterized the 1947-1957 period as the formative period of Cold War economic relations, analyzing that the trade patterns and institutions established during this period became the foundation for subsequent Soviet-Western economic relations during the Cold War, and that a trade structure was established whereby the Soviet Union exported raw materials to the West and imported manufactured goods and technology, which reflected structural vulnerabilities in the Soviet economy. He also assessed that the Cold War was not simply political and military confrontation but included complex economic interactions, and that Soviet-Western economic relations had a contradictory character of coexisting confrontation and cooperation.⁷

He also conducted in-depth analysis of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany. West Germany was one of the Soviet Union's most important Western trade partners during the Cold War, and Soviet-West German trade increased rapidly from the mid-1950s. Kim emphasized that the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt's government in the 1970s brought Soviet-West German economic relations to a new stage; in 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany concluded a large-scale natural gas pipeline construction contract, with the Soviet Union exporting natural gas to West Germany while West Germany provided equipment such as pipes and compressors, which became a symbolic project of Soviet-Western economic cooperation. He assessed that the development of Soviet-West German economic relations contributed to laying the economic foundation for German unification in the long term; when East Germany's economic crisis deepened in the late 1980s, West Germany provided economic support, which increased the East German regime's dependence on West Germany, and the economic cooperative relationship with West

⁷ Kim Donghyuk, "A Reinterpretation of Cold War through Changes in Trade between the Soviet Union and the West, 1947-1957," *Sungshin Humanities Research* 42 (2020): 1-21.

Germany played an important role in the background of Soviet consent to unification during the 1989-1990 German unification process.⁸

There is also important research analyzing the impact of increased Soviet-Western trade on the Soviet fiscal structure. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union began introducing large-scale industrial equipment from the West, and this trade expansion caused the Soviet Union's foreign currency shortage problem; the Soviet Union began increasing borrowing from Western financial markets, and from the late 1960s, the Soviet Union borrowed from Western financial institutions through the Eurodollar market. This fundamentally changed the nature of Soviet public debt; in the 1970s, the Soviet Union obtained massive foreign currency income from oil exports and could import large quantities of grain and consumer goods from the West, and Soviet oil export income surged with the first oil shock in 1973. However, from the late 1970s, Soviet oil production began to stagnate, and when oil prices plummeted in 1986, Soviet foreign currency income sharply decreased, while simultaneously military expenditures from the Afghanistan War and the burden of economic support for Eastern Europe increased, deteriorating Soviet finances. Kim analyzed that the expansion of Soviet-Western trade enabled the Soviet economy to receive needed technology and consumer goods in the short term, but in the long-term resulted in subordinating the Soviet economy to the capitalist world economic system, which was one of the major causes of the Soviet economic crisis in the late 1980s.⁹

The special significance of energy trade in Soviet-Western relations during the Cold War was also analyzed. From the 1960s, the Soviet Union began exporting oil and natural gas to Western Europe, which became the Soviet Union's most important source of foreign currency income, and large-scale natural gas pipeline projects were pursued in the 1970s. Western European countries provided funding and technology for these projects, and the Soviet Union concluded long-term supply contracts. The United States expressed concern about such energy cooperation; the Reagan

⁸ Kim Donghyuk, "The Development of Trade Relationship between the Soviet Union and West Germany during the Cold War and German Unification, 1953-1985," *Critical Review of History* 133 (2020): 92-121.

⁹ Kim Donghyuk, "Soviet Economy's Integration into Capitalist Trade System and Changes in the Nature of USSR's Public Debt," *The Western History Review* 151 (2021): 9-33.

administration pressured Western European countries to halt pipeline projects with the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, and the United States argued that if Western Europe became excessively dependent on Soviet energy, it would become politically vulnerable, but Western European countries rejected American pressure and continued energy cooperation with the Soviet Union. He assessed that Soviet-Western energy trade was the economic foundation that enabled “long détente”; mutual dependence through energy trade served as a safety mechanism that made both sides avoid extreme confrontation and maintain dialogue, but simultaneously this dependent relationship deepened the structural vulnerabilities of the Soviet economy, and the Soviet Union lost manufacturing competitiveness while becoming excessively dependent on energy exports and developed an economic structure vulnerable to oil price fluctuations.¹⁰

Kim also analyzed Soviet-Western economic relations not only in terms of macroscopic trade statistics but also at the microscopic level of technology cooperation in specific industrial sectors. This is important for understanding how the Soviet Union introduced and utilized Western technology and what problems it faced in the process.

He analyzed at a microscopic level the process of the Soviet Union expanding technology cooperation with the West in the early Brezhnev period. The Soviet Ministry of Light Industry concluded technology transfer contracts with Western companies and introduced production equipment, importing the latest spinning and knitting machines from Italian and French textile machinery manufacturers and chemical fiber production technology from West Germany. He specifically revealed through archival materials from institutions under the Ministry of Light Industry how these technology introduction projects were executed. However, Kim pointed out that technology introduction did not achieve expected results; major problems included lack of skilled personnel to operate introduced equipment, inadequate equipment maintenance and parts supply, difficulties in integrating introduced technology into

¹⁰ Kim Donghyuk, “Oil and Gas Trade between the Soviet Union and the West during the Cold War and the Long Détente,” *Critical Review of History* 145 (2023): 28-55.

the Soviet production system, and bureaucratic decision-making structures hindering rapid technology application. Consequently, many advanced equipment was underutilized and left idle, and Kim concluded that the effect of technology transfer was limited because the Soviet Union introduced Western technology but lacked the institutional and organizational conditions necessary to effectively utilize it.¹¹

Technology cooperation in another industrial sector, the food industry, was also analyzed. The Brezhnev regime promised to improve the standard of living and needed modernization of the food industry, and the Soviet Union sought to introduce food processing technology, packaging technology, and refrigerated storage facilities from the West. While such technology cooperation was assessed to have contributed to improving productivity and quality in some areas of Soviet food industry, structural problems appeared here as well, with unstable supply of food raw materials, inefficiency of transportation and distribution systems, and lack of understanding of consumer demand limiting the effects of technology introduction. It was pointed out that the case of the Soviet food industry sector showed patterns similar to the light industry sector; the Soviet Union invested considerable resources in introducing advanced Western technology but failed to effectively integrate and utilize the introduced technology in actual production environments, and this reflected fundamental limitations of the Soviet economic system—the rigidity of planned economy, bureaucratic inefficiency, and absence of market feedback mechanisms.¹²

A particularly notable achievement in Korean scholarship on Soviet economic studies is research on Soviet-North Korean economic cooperation relations. A series of studies systematically analyzed Soviet economic support to North Korea in the 1950s and North Korea's responses.

Kim Jaewoong analyzed conflicts between North Korea and the Soviet Union that emerged during North Korea's economic recovery process after the Korean War.

¹¹ Kim Donghyuk, "Technological and Economic Exchanges between the Soviet Union and the West, 1965-1970: The Cases of Institutions and Companies under the Ministry of Light Industry of the Soviet Union," *Cogito* 98 (2022): 71-99

¹² Kim Donghyuk, "Economic and Technological Trade between the Soviet Union and the West: The Case of the Ministry of Food Industry of the Soviet Union from 1965 to 1975," *The Journal of Western History* 68 (2023): 5-28.

Massive external support was needed to recover the North Korean economy devastated by war. The Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European socialist countries provided free aid to North Korea, but it was insufficient to fully meet North Korea's demands. After Stalin's death in 1953, as Soviet foreign policy changed, the Soviet Union sought to readjust support to North Korea. Khrushchev pursued a "peaceful coexistence" policy, expanding economic support to the Third World but simultaneously seeking to increase support efficiency. In this process, a gap emerged between the scale of support North Korea demanded and the scale of support the Soviet Union could provide, which caused tension in North-Soviet relations. Kim revealed that North Korea's economic difficulties in the mid-1950s were not simply the result of war damage but the combined effect of excessive heavy industry priority policy and decreased Soviet support.¹³

Lee Jooho produced research analyzing Soviet economic cooperation systems toward North Korea at an organizational level. The Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) was established in 1957 to oversee economic cooperation with socialist countries and Third World countries. GKES established representative offices in each country, including North Korea. The GKES North Korea Representative Office managed Soviet economic support projects to North Korea, coordinated trade with North Korea, and supervised the activities of Soviet experts. He specifically revealed through analysis of internal documents of the GKES North Korea Representative Office how this institution operated and what role it played in economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea. He particularly showed that the representative office reported on North Korea's economic situation to Soviet authorities and influenced the formulation of Soviet support policy.¹⁴

Lee also analyzed attempts at economic integration within the socialist camp and North Korea's responses. From the late 1950s, the Soviet Union sought to establish an international division of labor system within the socialist camp. Through

¹³ Kim Jaewoong, "North Korea's Economic Hardship and the Conflict between North Korea and the Soviet Union in the Mid 1950s," *The Historical Journal* 104 (2021): 137-71.

¹⁴ Lee Jooho, "A Study on Representative in DPRK of The State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of Soviet Union (GKES) in late 1950s," *The Journal of Korean History* 193 (2021): 303-35.

the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), it sought to coordinate each country's economic development and pursue efficient resource allocation. The Soviet international division of labor concept was for each country to specialize in industries where they had comparative advantage and exchange necessary goods through mutual trade. However, North Korea did not actively participate in this concept. North Korea emphasized building a self-reliant national economy and sought to prioritize development of heavy industry. Lee analyzed that North Korea refused because accepting the Soviet international division of labor concept would require specializing in light industry and raw material production, which conflicted with North Korea's heavy industry priority policy.¹⁵

Lee also analyzed changes in Soviet free aid policy toward North Korea. In August 1956, the Soviet Union and North Korea concluded a new economic aid agreement. This agreement differed in nature from emergency aid provided immediately after the Korean War. The Soviet Union promised comprehensive support including industrial plant construction, technology transfer, and expert dispatch to support North Korea's long-term economic development. However, he pointed out that the 1956 agreement, unlike previous free aid, began to take on the character of conditional support considering North Korea's repayment capacity. The Soviet Union sought to recover compensation for equipment and technology provided to North Korea in the long term, which presaged a transition from free aid to paid aid. North Korea expressed dissatisfaction with this change in Soviet attitude, which became another factor of conflict in North-Soviet relations in the late 1950s.¹⁶

Finally, Lee analyzed the steel industry, a core case of North Korean heavy industry recovery. Steel is the foundation of heavy industry, and North Korea made recovery and development of the steel industry its top priority. During the Japanese colonial period, steel mills such as Kimchaek Steel Mill (former Chongjin Steel Mill) and Hwanghae Steel Mill were built in the North Korean region, but they suffered

¹⁵ Lee Jooho, "The Theory of International Division of Labor in the Socialist Camp and North Korea's Responses to It in the 1950s," *The Journal of Korean History* 199 (2022): 287-325.

¹⁶ Lee Jooho, "The Continuance and Change of the Soviet Union's Grants to North Korea in the 1950s: With a Focus on the Economic Aid Agreement of August 1956," *Korean Studies* 67 (2022): 643-675.

significant damage during the Korean War. The Soviet Union supported the recovery of North Korean steel industry with equipment and technology. Concentrated support went particularly to the recovery of Kimchaek Steel Mill. Soviet experts were dispatched to North Korea to participate in steel mill design, construction, and operation. Lee analyzed that Soviet support played a decisive role in North Korean steel industry recovery but simultaneously deepened dependence on Soviet-style technical systems. He also pointed out the dilemma that while North Korea sought to overcome colonial-period production structures, it had no choice but to utilize industrial infrastructure built by Imperial Japan. North Korea emphasized building a self-reliant national economy, but realistically economic recovery was impossible without Soviet support. This contradiction functioned as a structural constraint on North Korean economic development.¹⁷

Park Ahreum's research specifically analyzed the process of North Korea's departure from the socialist international division of labor system. 1962 was an important turning point in North Korean economic policy. That year, North Korea adopted a line of simultaneously pursuing national defense and economy and further strengthened prioritization of heavy industry development. Park revealed that North Korea's 1962 policy transition was closely related to the international context. As the Sino-Soviet split intensified, North Korea found space to expand diplomatic autonomy between the Soviet Union and China. Additionally, the Cuban Missile Crisis and heightened military tension on the Korean Peninsula made North Korea feel the necessity of strengthening national defense capabilities. In this situation, North Korea judged it more advantageous to build a self-reliant economic system rather than participate in the Soviet-led international division of labor system.¹⁸

IV. Soviet Economic Management System Reform: Sovnarkhoz and Changes in Centralized Management

¹⁷ Lee Jooho, "Reconstruction of North Korean Steel Industry and Soviet Union's support in 1950s: How They Overcome the Colonial Legacy in Industrial Production," *History and the World* 65 (2024): 67-100.

¹⁸ Park Ahreum, "Analysis of Democratic People's Republic of Korea's departure from the 'International Socialist Division of Labor' in 1962," *Critical Studies on Modern Korean History* 45 (2021): 445-83.

Research on changes in the Soviet economic management system is one of the most thoroughly developed fields in Korean scholarship on Soviet economic studies. These studies analyzed the reform process of the Soviet economic management system from the Khrushchev period to the early Brezhnev period from multiple angles.

Kim analyzed the reform process of the Soviet economic management system during the Khrushchev period centered on an institution called the Scientific Research Economic Institute (NIEI). This period was an important transitional period when attempts were made to break away from the highly centralized Stalinist economic management system. NIEI was a research institution established with the goal of scientizing and rationalizing Soviet economic management and led efforts to apply scientific methodology to economic planning and management. It was researched that NIEI researchers studied national economic balance sheet preparation, inter-sectoral balance analysis, and optimization of resource allocation, developing various methodologies for establishing economic plans more precisely and scientifically, and particularly that NIEI researchers played an important role in the 1965 Kosygin reform debate by arguing for expanding enterprise self-accounting, improving economic efficiency indicators, and rationalizing price formation mechanisms. However, their proposals faced political backlash; conservative Party bureaucrats worried that economic reform could shake the foundation of socialist planned economy, and industrial bureaucrats accustomed to existing economic management methods either could not understand or rejected new methodologies. It was assessed that NIEI's experience demonstrates the fundamental dilemma of Soviet economic management; technical efforts to make economic planning scientific and increase efficiency were necessary but their effects were limited due to constraints of political control and bureaucratic interests, and consequently NIEI's theoretical proposals were only partially implemented and did not lead to fundamental reform of Soviet economic management.¹⁹

¹⁹ Kim Donghyuk, "The Advancement of the Soviet Economic Management System and Central Economic Institutes of the USSR from 1955 to 1965: Focusing on the Scientific Research Economic Institute of Gosplan," *The Western History Review* 135 (2017): 9-36.

He also analyzed the Sovnarkhoz system, the most ambitious economic management reform of the Khrushchev period. Sovnarkhoz was a regional-based economic management institution introduced by Khrushchev in 1957 to replace the centralized ministerial (*Ministerstvo*) system; the industrial ministry system of the Stalin period caused “departmentalism” (*vedomstvennost*) as each ministry managed only its jurisdictional industry, which led to resource waste and inefficiency. To solve this problem, Khrushchev abolished industrial ministries and established regional Sovnarkhozes to integrally manage all industries within a region; 105 Sovnarkhozes were established in 1957 and came to integrally manage economic activities in each region. Kim revealed that the Sovnarkhoz reform caused unexpected problems; the biggest problem was difficulty in inter-regional coordination, each Sovnarkhoz prioritized its regional interests and displayed regional egoism (*mestnichestvo*), inter-industry coordination became difficult and technology standardization and innovation were hindered, and problems of insufficient expertise of Sovnarkhoz practitioners emerged. Khrushchev recognized the problems of the Sovnarkhoz reform and attempted adjustments several times but did not solve fundamental problems, and after Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime officially abolished the Sovnarkhoz system in 1965 and restored the industrial ministry system. Kim concluded that this was not simply a return to the old system but a modified ministry system reflecting the experience of the Sovnarkhoz reform, and the restored ministries had more coordination mechanisms than before and institutional devices to strengthen inter-ministerial cooperation were established, and the failure of the Sovnarkhoz reform clearly revealed the fundamental dilemma of centrally planned economy—the dilemma between the inefficiency of centralized coordination and the coordination failure of decentralized management.²⁰

Ko Kwangyeol’s research analyzed how the relationship between departmentalism and regionalism unfolded in 1957, the first year of the Sovnarkhoz

²⁰ Kim Donghyuk, “Soviet Economic Reforms and Reorganization of the Soviet Government from 1957 to 1965: Reorganization from Economic Councils to Ministries and its Meaning,” *The Historical Journal* 100 (2020): 239-78:

reform. Khrushchev introduced Sovnarkhoz to overcome departmentalism (*vedomstvennost'*), but in reality, the result was that departmentalism was replaced by regionalism (*mestnichestvo*). Ko organized the problems that appeared in the first year of the Sovnarkhoz reform into three categories: first, inter-regional resource allocation coordination became difficult and as each regional Sovnarkhoz made independent decisions, nationwide resource allocation was distorted; second, inter-industry technology standardization and innovation were hindered, and as inter-industry coordination mechanisms weakened, different technologies and standards came to be used by region even within the same industry; third, problems of insufficient expertise of Sovnarkhoz practitioners emerged, as they had to manage multiple industries simultaneously but lacked deep expertise in each industry. He emphasized that the experience of the first year of reform in 1957 is important for understanding the subsequent development process of the Sovnarkhoz system; problems that appeared in the early stage of reform persisted for the next eight years and ultimately led to the abolition of the reform in 1965, and the transition from departmentalism to regionalism did not fundamentally solve coordination problems.²¹

Unlike existing research that analyzed Sovnarkhoz mainly in terms of domestic economic management, Ko elucidated what role Sovnarkhoz played in Soviet foreign economic exchange. After the 1957 Sovnarkhoz reform, regional Sovnarkhozi were partially granted authority to directly contact foreign companies and government delegations, and particularly Sovnarkhozes in border regions played the role of “outposts” in promoting economic cooperation with neighboring countries. Ko analyzed that Sovnarkhoz’s foreign exchange activities were important in two aspects: first, it promoted practical economic cooperation at the regional level, and Sovnarkhoz could pursue small-scale trade, technology exchange, joint projects, etc. with neighboring countries without going through the central government’s complex approval procedures; second, it diversified the Soviet Union’s foreign economic strategy during the Cold War, enabling flexible cooperation at the regional level

²¹ Ko Kwangyeol, “The Relationship Between Departmentalism and Regionalism in the First Year of the Sovnarkhoz Reform in the Soviet Union,” *The Journal of Western History* 71 (2024): 177-204.

separate from large-scale cooperation at the central government level. However, Sovnarkhoz's foreign exchange authority was limited; important projects still required central government approval and Sovnarkhoz had to follow the central foreign economic policy guidelines.²²

V. Conclusion and Prospects

Since 2010, Soviet economic research in South Korean academia has grown substantially both quantitatively and qualitatively. Several emerging researchers have elucidated various aspects of the Soviet economy including its theoretical foundations, foreign relations, and economic management reforms through empirical research based on Russian-language primary sources. First, the theoretical development of Soviet economics was systematically analyzed. Research on the formation and development of the mathematical economics school, the theoretical background of the 1965 economic reform, the Liberman debate, price theory, and the reception of cybernetics revealed that Soviet economics attempted theoretical innovation for solving practical problems rather than remaining confined to dogmatic Marxism-Leninism. Additionally, extensive research on Soviet-Western economic relations elucidated the complex aspects of East-West economic exchange during the Cold War. Second, the important economic management system reform of the Khrushchev period, the Sovnarkhoz reform, was analyzed from multiple angles. Research on the relationship between departmentalism and regionalism, the role in foreign exchange, and MTS reorganization in the agricultural sector empirically revealed the structural dilemmas of the Soviet economic management system. Third, particularly notable are systematic studies on Soviet-North Korean economic cooperation relations. These analyzed Soviet economic support to North Korea in the 1950s and North Korea's responses from multiple angles. These studies made important contributions to understanding the formation process of the North Korean economy and relations with the Soviet Union, demonstrating that Korean academia has pioneered an independent

²² Ko Kwangyeol, "The Roles of the Local Sovnarkhoz as 'Outpost' for Soviet Foreign Trade during the Cold War," *The Western History Review* 163 (2024): 9-45.

area in Soviet economic research. They also revealed the complex dynamics within the socialist camp during the Cold War by elucidating conflicts in North-Soviet relations and the process of North Korea's adoption of a self-reliant economic line.

Future research is expected to develop in the following directions. First, as accessibility to archival materials in Russia and former Soviet regions is maintained, more microscopic and empirical research will be possible. Particularly, more precise analysis of the actual operation of the Soviet economy will be possible through regional, industrial, and enterprise-level case studies. Second, comparative research among socialist economic blocs including the Soviet economy, Eastern Europe, North Korea, and China needs to be expanded. Comparative historical research on how each country received and modified the Soviet economic model and how the results differed is important for understanding the diversity and universality of socialist economic systems. Third, analysis of the long-term impact of the Soviet economic legacy on the economies of modern Russia and former Soviet states is required. Research elucidating how institutions and practices from the Soviet period persist to the present from a path dependent perspective is needed. Fourth, it is necessary to understand Soviet economic phenomena more three-dimensionally through interdisciplinary research combining economics, history, political science, sociology, etc. An integrated approach is needed that understands the Soviet economy not simply from the perspective of economic efficiency but within social, cultural, and political contexts.

For South Korea, a country with the experience of division and the Cold War, research on the Soviet economy and socialist system holds important meaning beyond mere academic interest for understanding Korea's history and future. In-depth research on the Soviet economic system is also necessary for understanding the North Korean economy. I hope that Soviet economic research in Korean academia will continue to develop through active exchange with Russian and international academic communities.

**Discussion on “Results and Prospects of the Studies on the Soviet
Economy and Its Management System in South Korea”**

Ruben Kazarian (Institute of Oriental Studies)

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