Статьи

Buddhist Renaissance in Cambodia: Trends and Perspectives

Религия и общество на Востоке '2015, №0, с.63-73

Объем издания: 63-73

 
The article examines development of religious sphere in Cambodia which can be seen as a kind of Buddhist renaissance. This process began at the turn of the centuries and is still ongoing. The author demonstrates the positive dimensions of this phenomenon, such as: an increasing number of monasteries and monks, enhanced financial resources for the day to day running of monasteries, an influx of young members into Sangha, growing religious education and enhanced social activity of the clergy. The article also analyses the negative consequences of the Buddhist renaissance – commercialization of Sangha, weakened discipline among its ranks, politicization of the clergy, and a noticeable intensification of protest mood among urban monks.

Ключевые слова: Buddhism, Sangha, Cambodia, monastery, political activity, commercialization of Sangha, Cambodian People’s Party, elections.

For centuries, Buddhist values have been woven deeply into the fabric of community life in Cambodia, including politics, ideology, economy and social structure. Accordingly, any substantive change in the social, political or economic sphere had an inevitable impact on religious values as such, and on the way they were propagated and personified by the Buddhist Sangha.

Political stability and a steady economic growth that began in Cambodia at the turn of the century, had a beneficial effect on the religious domain, and generated a sort of Buddhist renaissance that has already been in evidence for over two decades.

Buddhism in Cambodia has the status of state religion, and the Nation-Throne-Religion triad is the key ideological guideline of the nation laid down in its constitution. Buddhism has always provided the spiritual foundation for the Khmer monarchy. Not incidentally, the statement on the principles underlying the policies of the Royal Government of Cambodia, says, in particular: “Khmer Buddhism serves to consolidate the framework of the Royal power”[1].

The revival of Buddhism in Cambodia is vividly illustrated by statistical data – between 1990 and 2014, the number of regular clergy in Cambodia increased by a factor of 7 – from 8 thousand to 57.3 thousand persons, while the number of monasteries grew more than 1.5 times – from 2.8 thousand to 4.6 thousand[2]. Throughout the period, about 70 – 80 monasteries were built in the country each year. Proceeding from the average costs involved in the construction of a monastery, that total an approximate amount of 155 thousand US dollars, the aggregate costs related to religious construction reached an annual amount of 12.5 million US dollars. Over 90 per cent of that amount was represented by donations from local population, primarily, the nation’s political and business elite[3].

The bulk of the Buddhist monastic community – around 80 per cent – is made up of young people not older than 30 years of age, who largely come from the poor peasant families, with some rare exceptions. The Buddhist community furnishes a certain material guarantee to them in terms of their subsistence and also offers a reliable social protection scheme.

Most of those young people see taking monastic vows as the only possibility for them to get free education and raise their social status. The period of staying at a monastery can vary from 7 to 15 years, depending on the quality standard of education they seek to attain. In 2014, there were 1,370 Buddhist educational establishments in Cambodia, which imparted knowledge to over 30 thousand monks[4].

Normally, upon completion of the education, most monks leave the Sangha to pursue a secular lifestyle. As a result, the Sangha has become a kind of migration channel for those men, who have poor peasant origin, and go to the city, where they settle down after having left the monastery. There is evidence that for the majority of ex-monks, their monastic background offers additional chances to gain success in the mundane world.

In recent years, the country has focused more intensely on various Buddhist holidays and on observing more scrupulously the ceremonial aspects of such religious festivities.

Most critical of those holidays are declared to be national holidays and non-working days. Both for the political elite and for ordinary citizens holidays are associated with the most common form of public demonstration of their commitment to Buddhism, which implies a mandatory visit to a monastery and presentation of gifts to the Buddhist Sangha. According to unofficial data released by the Ministry of Cult and Religious Affairs, the value of all gifts given to the Sangha at the time of celebrating the Bon Kathen religious festival alone[5] is accumulating sums in excess of 6 million US dollars[6].

Over the past decade, the Sangha has dramatically extended the scope of its activities. Monks have been granted access to the widest possible audience – they have been given an opportunity to take part in radio and TV programs and also to make addresses before school and university students. The Sangha has paid a great deal of attention to enhancing its positions in the field of education. Efforts have been made to revitalize the role of monastic charity schools for children, who come from poor peasant families, with a view of gradually turning monasteries into cultural centers comprising a school, a library and a reading room. A segment of the most advanced monks are in favor of these new forms of social activities. A key example of such an innovative approach is offered by the endeavors carried out by the Buddhism for Development Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), that has subsidiaries in 8 Cambodian provinces and integrates both monks and lay believers (predominantly, former monks)[7]. The activities of Buddhism for Development are primarily focused on participating in environmental campaigns against destructive deforestation, implementing alternative programs of economic progress through making peasants familiar with the more advanced methods of farm management, supporting the human rights NGOs in getting across to the broad public the concept of liberal democracy that monks tend to insert into traditional Buddhist context, which renders it more easy understandable to the Khmer peasants, according to the NGO opinions. The monks also participate in the programs designed to help orphans, single mothers, AIDS patients, disabled individuals etc. A substantial financial support has been given by ordinary citizens to the Life and Hope Association (LHA) project launched by the monks of the ancient Wat Damnak monastery in the Siem Reap province. Within its framework the clergy have provided all-round assistance – material and psychologic help, as well as consultancy – to low-income families[8].

Such endeavors undertaken by the Buddhist clergy have helped the rural monasteries to retain their role of crucial centers, where the entire social practice of the rural community is concentrated, at the same time; the monks have exerted considerable influence on the formation of public opinion in the rural areas, while retaining the status of “informal” traditional leaders. The solid positions held by the Buddhist Sangha within the Cambodian society have been also corroborated by statistical surveys. Thus, more than 63 per cent of respondents have noted the high degree of the monastic community integration into Khmer social environment[9].

However, alongside with its positive tendencies, Buddhist renaissance had produced certain negative phenomena. Specifically, rapid growth of the number of monasteries in Cambodia has highlighted the shortage of clergymen, especially of senior standing. As a result, many temples are headed by clergymen who are very superficially acquainted with their responsibilities and enjoy little respect from the lay believers[10], whereas some of the monasteries have no senior priests at all. Nevertheless, the personality of a senior priest, who is entrusted with the responsibility to carry out some administrative functions, in addition to religious duties, is a factor of primary importance in determining the functional performance of the Buddhist community, the scope and efficiency of its social contacts, all of which have a bearing upon the overall prestige of a given monastery.

According to the Ministry of Cult and Religious Affairs, too many monasteries are under construction in the country, and it would be better to direct the funds allocated for such purposes to satisfy other fundamental needs of the Buddhist Sangha[11]. These needs include, primarily, the improvement of religious education, where standards of quality have remained relatively low so far, largely due to the lack of teachers of the core religious disciplines.

The tangible monetary donations offered to the Sangha are also fraught with ambivalent consequences. They have led to its commercialization and brought about a sharp income inequality among the monasteries. The financial standing of this or that monastery is largely defined by personal preferences of the representatives of political elites, who have allocated the greater part of finances for the operation of monastic service.

Commercialization of Buddhism has had a very negative impact on the moral image of some segments of the clergy. Lay believers have often made unflattering comments about the conduct of the Sangha members, claiming that a segment of monks have used Buddhism for the purpose of personal financial benefit, that they do not see a temple in Pagoda, but a place to “make money” at[12]. A political analyst from Cambodia Chea Vannath, with reference to the results of social surveys, asserts that the propensity towards conflict in the relationships between lay believers and monks has increased, as, according to her, under conditions of a substantial growth in monetary gifts to the monasteries, “monks are prone to think of their own wellbeing, rather than of the teaching of Buddha”[13].

In recent years, the issue of monks’ discipline has featured prominently on the agenda facing the Congresses of Cambodian Buddhist Monks, as monks hsve failed to duly observe the Buddhist moral and ethical prescriptions and ceased “to exemplify the Buddhist moral values”[14] for the local residents. Earlier, the Khmer monks were described as “quiet, sober-minded, modest and shy”[15], in contrast, today, the public is often made aware of shocking cases when young members of the Sangha are found guilty of violating public order. Thus, throughout 2009 – 2014, over a dozen monks were deprived of their membership in the religious order for various breaches of public order, including alcohol abuse, fist-fighting and banditry, on a recurrent annual basis.

In 2012, the Ministry of Cult and Religious Affairs began to implement a series of reforms primarily designed to strengthen discipline within the Sangha, which, according to the Minister, is the basic precondition for maintaining the high authority of the Buddhist community among the local population[16].

However, in private conversations, the Ministry employees have expressed skepticism over the successful outcome of reforms. Many offences are regarded within the Sangha as an “inevitable evil” objectively generated in the result of the globalization process. “Before, we have never heard of any excessive drinking episodes within the Sangha, – says an employee with the Buddhist Institute, Dr. Mieh Pon, – but now it has become a widespread phenomenon. Frankly speaking, we have never had so many restaurants, bars or shops selling alcoholic drinks before[17]. It is one of the manifestations of globalization and of the impact that the Western lifestyle has had on us. Young people are particularly susceptible to the external influence and are prone to easily yield to the temptations of mundane life”[18].

Indeed, the Cambodian society has been changing very rapidly and the challenge for the Sangha is to retain its traditional sacred status while undergoing transformation aimed at embracing such changes. Under the existing doctrine, the life of a monk should be a prime example of refraining from mundane pursuits and implementing the righteousness formula. However, it is extremely difficult to follow this formula under contemporary conditions, especially for the monks who serve their religious duty in urban monasteries. The large monasteries in the capital are located in downtown Phnom Penh, in the very midst of the new tide of life. There is no “symbolic distance” traditionally separating a monastery from the village in the rural areas. Monks stroll down along the streets, they ride in the city transport, study at higher educational establishments together with laymen, communicate with tourists etc., i.e. they are actively involved in the modern life of society that is full of temptations.

According to a Russian researcher of Buddhism, Alexander Agadzhanyan, an apparent bias towards secularization of the Sangha has been observed in all the countries that practice adherence to Theravada Buddhism[19].

A fairly ambivalent impact was caused to the Sangha by its growing politicization. Under conditions of the Buddhist revival, religious factor started to play a visible part in the political landscape of Cambodia. The intention of the ruling elites to turn the Buddhist community into its power base has been increasingly traceable. Getting the monks involved in official politics provides the country’s leadership with an additional leverage over the Sangha and opens up new possibilities for manipulation using the “resources of religious charisma”, which are no less vital in Cambodia than human or physical resources.

A deliberately blatant demonstration of support to the Sangha and commitment to Buddhism is the key element of the political image of the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The nation’s leader – Prime Minister Hun Sen has energetically used the Sangha patronage, as a concealed mechanism for traditional legitimization of his power. The most effective strategy for positioning the CPP as a “Buddhist party”, likewise for presenting the Prime Minister as a real patron of the Sangha is to give monetary donations to the monastic community, which in terms of their amount, intensity and, most importantly, magnitude of their publicity, have gone far beyond any similar actions undertaken by the King, a traditional long-term patron of the Sangha.

Religious charity has acquired a high public visibility in Cambodia. The names of the donors are indicated on the massive stone walls surrounding the monasteries, and therefore, they are known to each passer-by. A personal monogram of Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is an indisputable leader in providing “sponsorship” for the religious construction, is portrayed on all the largest monasteries in Phnom Penh.

Large-scale financial endowments have allowed the CPP to set up a client-oriented network among the senior priests of the monasteries both in the capital and in the provinces. A generous monetary patronage on behalf of the ruling elites has naturally resulted in political engagement of the leaders of the Buddhist Sangha, who have de facto rejected the principle of non-interference in political affairs by explicitly yielding their preference to the CPP.

In all of their public addresses, the Sangha hierarchs have specifically mentioned the “wise policies of Prime Minister Hun Sen, owing to which the country has witnessed an unprecedented heyday of Buddhism”[20]. They refer to Hun Sen as an “exemplary Buddhist” and “monuh mien bon” – a person who possesses a great many religious merits, which reaffirms his reputation of a leader with extraordinary life energy. According to the influential religious publication Kambujasuriya, “Hun Sen has led the country being strictly guided by Dharma and relying on the moral and ethical norms of Buddhism. The huge success that has been achieved by Cambodia over the recent decade was largely attributable to the profound commitment of the Prime Minister to Buddhism”[21].

The peak of the CPP religious activities has always coincided with the election cycle. The most essential component (and until recently, the one that has never failed to win a victory) of the CPP strategy for attracting rural voters has been reliance on traditional leaders – the senior priests in the monasteries. In many areas, it was precisely the Pagoda that served as a major platform for the election campaign. Before the general elections in 2013, for instance, the high ranking officials of the ruling party showed a record tightly packed schedule of Pagoda visitation, which was accompanied by an intensive program of gifs and large monetary donations. As before, the Prime Minister was second to none in that “marathon competition”. The Khmer press ran the following comment in this connection: “We have 57 thousand monks in our country, and we have the impression that during election campaign the Prime Minister wants to “capture the hearts and minds” of all of them”.

Hun Sen had not missed a single opportunity for posing in the capacity of a true Buddhist. His election speeches were full of assertions that “he and the Buddhist teaching are inseparable”, and that “whenever he has a chance to listen to the Buddhist prayer before his meals, the food tastes much better”, and in his future life, he wants to be a “temple boy” again”[22]. The massive religious charity efforts applied by Hun Sen and other CPP bosses were presented to the population not so much as the accumulation of “religious merits” by them, but rather as a crucial part of the CPP social program. The construction of a new Pagoda (according to Hun Sen himself) is the underlying principle of the CPP policies targeted at supporting the elderly people in order to provide them with a possibility of spending their old years within the monastery and also at helping children from low-income families to get a free education at the temple[23]. Caring about the Sangha was directly linked by the authorities to the outcome of general election. The chief slogan used by the CPP in approaching the clergy was as follows: “It is only the ruling party that can ensure the highest level of wellbeing for the Sangha that it is enjoying now”. The “religious marathon” has yielded its positive results to the CPP, primarily, in rural areas, where the level of religious piety has remained very high. However, it caused an opposite effect in big cities, especially in Phnom Penh, amid the clergy and laymen alike. The monks based in Phnom Penh are mainly represented by the young generation aged from 18 to 30, they did not conceal their negative attitude towards the political pressure exerted on them by the senior priest of the monasteries. Moreover, the generous monetary donations were not considered by the young clergy as a demonstration of high religious piety on behalf of the ruling quarters, but were regarded as an expression of their political cynicism and their striving to turn the Sangha into an instrument of power[24]. For this reason, the segment of young Phnom Penh monks who decided to participate in the election, cast their votes in favor of the opposition, sustaining their posture by the argument that “the ruling party is not capable of and is in no position to control the will of the monks”[25]. For the majority of urban citizens, whose religious devotion is in fact reduced to observing the rites and ceremonial aspects of religion, the diverse Buddhist slogans were not given a top priority status and did not bring any more votes to the CPP.

The issue of monks participating in the election is one of the most debatable political questions among the monks and also society representatives. Monks were granted such right under the 1993 Constitution, but were not encouraged to do so by Buddhist prescriptions, pursuant to which the clergy should stay non-committal to the political agenda.

Venerable Dr. Hok Savann, an elderly monk, pointing to the danger of such policies, noted: “The authorities, while getting the clergy involved in the elections, have pursued their own objectives, fleeting political objectives – to secure and win more ballots from the voters. However, they are not aware of the damage caused by it to the pure nature of the Buddhist religion. The Buddhist path is the middle way based on non-alliance with either party. It is based on non-partisan approach or is above the party level”[26]. Hok Savann sees a close connection between the Sangha politicization and the loosening of discipline within its ranks. “The guarantee of unity, prosperity and high authority status of the Sangha, he maintains, is derived from the stringent compliance with the Vinaya rules by all of the Sangha members. Participating in the election, after being encouraged by the politicians, means that the monks commit a breach of the Vinaya. And if a monk has committed a breach of one of the provisions of the disciplinary charter, then he is inwardly prepared to breach the other provisions. This is what we witness now within the Khmer Sangha”[27].

In the opinion of Hok Savann, the more the clergy are drawn into official politics, particularly, through the election process, the higher is the risk of a discord within the Sangha[28]. Field research conducted by the author in November, 2010, in Phnom Penh showed that a rift, albeit hidden, had already been shaped. If the representatives of Sangha official leadership have maintained close relationships with the ruling party, then, at least, the ordinary monks in the capital city do not share the political preferences of their hierarchs. Predominantly, the ordinary monks are young people aged from 18 to 30, they come from poor provincial peasant families, for them taking the religious vows and joining the Sangha is the only possibility to get an education. However, according to them, “corruption and the all-embracing system of relations based on patronage” leaves them little chance to realize their potential in the future. Many of them are critical towards the ruling party and feel sympathetic with the opposition, primarily, with the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) headed by Sam Rainsy, whose manifesto focuses on the improvement of living standards for the ordinary citizens, making the development of the social sphere and combatting corruption in the most severe manner the top priorities. The young clergy have keenly monitored the activities of the opposition, being familiar with its websites. Many Phnom Penh monks have participated in the protest rallies organized by the CNRP after the 2013 election, when they refused to accept the rigged election returns, as they maintained. At the same time, the mere form of the monks’ protest was couched in terms of Buddhist symbols. Thus, hundreds of monks, who were holding the alms bowls upside down in their hands, staged sit-in acts of protest in front of the National Assembly and the Government building. It meant that they refused to accept any donations from the authorities, depriving the latter of the possibility to earn religious merits[29].

A vivid example of the politicized segment of the Khmer monastic community is the Independent Monk Network for Social Justice set up in 2013 by the Venerable But Buntenh[30], who sharply criticized the policies pursued by the Government in social media. After the July, 2013, election, he supported the protest measures of the opposition and encouraged several young monks to join the protesters. Recently, But Buntenh has issued a claim to be the “spiritual leader of the Cambodian people in the fight against the repressive regime”, often comparing himself with the famous monk Hem Chieu – a symbol of resistance to the French colonial rule in Cambodia in the 1942.

Members of the Independent Monk Network for Social Justice offer their daily posts on the Facebook page, comprising a review of political developments with comments. The page was visited by over 10 thousand people in a short period of time, Since February 2014, But Buntenh has been a host of an hour long program broadcast by the Mohanokor FM radio station on Friday under the title ‘The Voice of Independent Monks’, through which he briefs the listeners on the news of religious life and also raises acute problems dealing with political, social and economic development of modern Cambodia, as a rule, critically assessing the activities of the country’s leaders and the ruling party – CPP[31].

The leaders of the Buddhist Sangha have repeatedly called on But Buntenh to cease his public activities, which, according to the Supreme Patriarch of the Mohanikay sect Non Nget ”are beyond the boundaries of Buddhism, are in breach of the monastic conduct and can affect social stability”[32]. In response to the critical remarks concerning his organization, But Buntenh has reiterated that “the duty of monks is to serve their people, especially, when any non-conformity is severely suppressed”[33].

The emergence of the Independent Monk Network for Social Justice testifies to the fact that a movement has surfaced within the Buddhist Sangha, it has articulated its stance with greater resolve, its advocates insist on their right, as citizens, to participate in the country’s political process in order to safeguard the interests of ordinary Khmer population. Although many influential clergy continue to assert that the political activities are detrimental to the purity of the Buddhist teaching[34], a significant part of the Phnom Penh monks share a favorable attitude towards But Buntenh and his organization. Having depleted the internal resources of exerting influence on the monks with a view to securing their de-politicization, the Sangha leaders made an appeal to the Government and Parliament requesting them to issue a legal ban on the participation in the election of the Sangha members[35].

Thus, the modern Khmer society is characterized by multidirectional tendencies regarding the Sangha. On the one hand, an obvious striving of the Cambodian People’s Party to maintain control over the Sangha by using the financial stimulation methods in relation to the Buddhist renaissance is in evidence, primarily, with a view to reinforcing the traditional components of Buddhist political culture, such as patronage and client-oriented relationships, paternalistic character of the supreme authority, commitment to the karma concept, as a fundamental basis to build relations between the ruling regime and the citizens. At the same time, the CPP is driven by the desire to retain the support of a considerable part of the rural voters, who have remained to be deeply committed to religious values.

On the other hand, over the last decade, secular sentiments have been definitely on the rise amid certain groups of the local population, for whom Buddhism is not so much a religious teaching, but a domain for their cultural self-identification. The growing secularization tendencies are prompted by a predominant presence of young age groups within the structure of the local population[36], the higher educational level of the young people, an accelerated process of urbanization, the growing social mobility of the population, civil maturity and political activity of the city residents etc. All of the above factors have given impulse to the formation of new values to be adhered to by the young segment of the Khmer society, for whom the traditionalism of the existing regime, inter alia, its reliance on the Sangha, has acquired a negative connotation, as being indicative of its archaic and ineffective nature.

However, despite the crisis phenomena affecting the Sangha in modern Cambodia, overall, Buddhism has remained of paramount importance for the country; it has proved to serve as a stabilizing foundation for the Khmer spiritual world. In particular, it protects a sense of national identity and national culture, as well as being a critical socio-integrating institution of society, both at the micro- and macro levels.

[1] Statement on the Principles Underlying the Policies of the Royal Government of Cambodia. Phnom Penh. 1993. P.1 (in Khmer).

[2] www.akp.gov.kh, 18.12.2014.

[3] An ordinary Khmer living in a province, as a rule, donates for the construction of a monastery about 10 dollars, whereas in the capital city – about 50 dollars, while the representatives of the ruling elite make donations worth tens of thousands of dollars.

[4] Data made available by the Ministry for Cult and Religious Affairs // www.mocar.gov.kh Address of 07.12.2014.

[5] Bon Kathen is the biggest Buddhist festival during which the donations to meet the needs of the Sangha are traditionally collected.

[6] The Phnom Penh Post. 16–29.10.1998.

[7] Buddhists run inspirational projects in Cambodia //www.buddhistchannel 01.11.2006; Scharff M. With Bold Determination and Strong Convictions, a Monk Develops Cambodia. www.buddhistchannel 19.02.2010.

[8] www.buddhistchannel 13.01.2012.

[9] Democracy in Cambodia – 2014. A Survey of the Cambodian Electorate. The Asia Foundation // www.asiafoundation.ogr. P. 36.

[10] Pong Pheakdey Boramy. The Practice of Cambodian Buddhism before the 1970 and Today. A Comparative Case Study of Tep Pranam Pagoda. Phnom Penh., 2004.

[11] Ledgerwood J. Buddhist Practice in Rural Kandal Province, 1960 and 2003 // People of Virtue / Ed. by Kent A. And Chandler D. Copenhagen, 2008. Р. 159.

[12]Kent A. Purchasing power and pagodas: The Sima monastic boundary and consumer politics in Cambodia // Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. No. 38, 2007. P. 350.

[13] The Phnom Penh Post. 19.12.2008.

[14] The Phnom Penh Post. 30.12.2009.

[15] Moura J. Le Rouyame du Cambodge. P., 1883. P. 200.

[16] www.buddhistchannel 04.01.2012; The Phnom Penh Post. 05.01.2011. (in Khmer).

[17] In the 1960s – 1970s, the country banned the sale of alcoholic drinks on the 9th and 15th day of the decrescent and increscent moon, which are considered to be sacred days and required strict observance of the Buddhist prescriptions.

[18] The author’s interview of 23.11.2010.

[19] Agadzhanyan А.S. The Buddhist Way in the 20th Century. Мoscow, 1993. P. 74–76 (in Russian).

[20] Kampuchea Thmey. 14.11.2010.

[21] Kambujasuriya (Phnom Penh), No. 1. 2006. P. 96.

[22] Hun Sen. Selected Extempore Recommendations during the Closing Session of the 21 Buddhist Monks Official Congress.//www.cnv.org.kh 27.02.2013.

[23] Hun Sen. Extempore Comments during Inauguration of Buildings in the Preah Sihamoni Raja Buddhist University in the compound of the Svay Pope Monastery // www.cnv.org.kh 14.02.2013.

[24] Bektimirova N.N. Interaction of the Buddhist Sangha and the Regime in the 21st Century // Vostok–Orients. No. 3, 2012 (in Russian).

[25] The Cambodia Daily. 18.12.2014.

[26] Hok Savann. The Role of Monks in the Khmer Community. Phnom Penh. 2008. P. 22 (in Khmer).

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid, P. 23; Hok Savann. The Role of Monks in the Khmer Community. Phnom Penh, 2008. P. 22 (in Khmer).

[29] The Cambodia Daily. 19.12.2014.

[30] Independent Monk Network for Social Justice. But Buntenh was born into a poor peasant family in Siem Reap in 1979. At the age of 20, he went into a monastery, got a scholarship to study at the Bombay University in India at the faculty of sociology. Having taken a Master’s degree, he returned to Cambodia and began teaching cultural anthropology and Buddhism at the Pannasastra University in Phnom Penh. In summer, 2013, the University administration did not renew the contract with him.

^[31] The Cambodia Daily. 01.02.2014.

^[32] The Cambodia Daily. 04.02.2014.

^[33] The Cambodia Daily. 01.02.2014.

^[34] Hok Savann. The Role of Monks in the Khmer Community. Phnom Penh. 2008 (in Khmer).

^[35] The Phnom Penh Post. 18.12.2014.

^[36] In 2014, 65.3% of the population was made up by the young people under 30 years of age. Please refer to: The World Factbook: Cambodia’s Age Structure. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) // www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html [Address on 5 January, 2014].